Originally Posted by
mm43
Which is the reason the THS started to move NU on the final climb into the stall, even though the elevator was around 7° NU.
The concurrent action of the PF slamming the sidestick against the back stop and holding it there probably contributed to the extreme THS angle.
Originally Posted by
Lyman
Would the THS have stopped had a shaker/pusher been installed? What manner of seductive force was applied to the regulator such that a shaker/pusher was not required on this aircraft? Would it have mooted all discussion by virtue of preventing the pilots from maintaining the STALL?
Because stall prevention works differently in a FBW airliner. Stick "pushers" were a relatively crude safety device that grew out of '50s technology, and the proliferation of T-tail designs from the late '50s to mid '60s. The only regulator that required them (regardless of empennage configuration) was the UK's CAA.
To my mind the only line accident where the stick pusher was a factor was the BEA548 Trident crash in Staines, and in that case the crew disabled the stick pusher in the middle of a stall, sealing the fate of the aircraft.
There are numerous cases of accidents where a stick shaker was ignored or dismissed as erroneous by the crew - including Birgenair.
One of the BEA's recommendations is for Airbus to bolster the auditory stall warning with extra visual clues.
However, based on prior experience it seems that if a stall warning or automatic recovery does not fit the crew's mental model, then even if you wire the stall warning to a cattle prod there's a chance that it will not be heeded.