Of course the Marines do not want to discuss the Over The Horizion (OTH) issue as it cannot be defended with any reasonable basis. The concept sounds good...and if achieved would promise good results in budget battles against the other Forces within DOD.
In shrinking budgets of course Costs are important issues....again the Marines want to avoid the spotlight getting shined on the Osprey Program as it is a huge chunk of their budget.
Think what you want about the Osprey in operations it is fit for....but remember it was sold as being the answer to every mission conceivable which it plainly is not and never was.
When you pull out the stops to get your Program and keep your Program...and let yourself get carried away in that process....don't be surprised when a critical review finds fault with the advertising claims.
Now...with that being said....let's hear a Marine Corps summary of the OTH Strategy as it stands now...right now....and where has it been a success and where has it failed to meet expectations. What is the true capability of the USMC/USN re OTH. How many Billions have been spent...and what operational capability have they purchased? Did we (the US Taxpayer) get our money's worth?
I plainly think NOT! Did we get something...sure....but what and at what cost?
Osprey Driver and others that think highly of the Osprey are quite welcome to do so and have a basis upon which to make that evaluation. Likewise, as Professional Marines and probably readers of "Proceedings", "The Marine Gazette" and other DOD related professional outlets...they can form an opinion about OTH and its current status.
Perhaps some googling and quoting from those sources might lay out other informed evaluations.
No matter how one wishes to try....divorcing the Osprey Program from OTH is not reasonable as OTH was the driving motivation for the Osprey. In actuality, even if OTH is finally acknowledged to be a complete failure....the Marines will find valuable uses for the Osprey just not the one it was designed for and sold as being critical in need.
This article discusses the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) which was one of the three legs of the OTH Stool...the other two being the Osprey and the LCAC. If you take the time to read the article...compare the thrust of the argument to that of the Osprey program. Consider the EFV program was cancelled by DOD recently as it was a total failure....leaving OTH without a self deployable armored amphibious infantry fighting vehicle. The author politely evades the OTH discussion by stating it is beyond the scope of the article despite the impact success or failure of the AFV Program has on OTH.
Just as in the EFV Program....does not success or failure of the Osprey program not have a similar effect upon OTH?
The EFV | Marine Corps Gazette
OD,
Having instructed in Simulators at two different helicopter manufactures....I am curious about the techniques used by the USMC in their Sim Training. What scenarios are used to do the Autorotations? It is well briefed, well planned, and done as a stand alone maneuver....or do you mix it up so at times the need to autorotate presents itself as an unannounced emergency situation. Do you introduce the evolution as being a second engine failure after some OEI flight?
What percentage of authoritative landings in the Sim are successful...no damage to the aircraft or occupants? Does that success rate improve with practice?