Originally Posted by soylentgreen
If you don't have doctoral-level statistics knowledge and don't understand this, I'd be happy to explain in more detail?
Nice example of paternalistic
appeal to authority. I'd be happy to see more details.
Originally Posted by soylentgreen
Care to explain your "Bad Science" comment?
Sure. You have proposed a method whereby 100 x 3-man crews would be put in a multi-day full-experience simulator. At some point, each crew would get on 1% of their flights an AF447-type scenario. No warning, it just happens. From this you would see what percentage "flubs" the scenario and determine from this whether it was pilots or machine the root cause of the AF447 demise. So far so good. Methodology seems sound, logic too. So it could be scientific. Why is it bad?
Because it is based on monumental misunderstanding of aviation and human factors in it. Logically correct conclusion from false premises is still false!
Originally Posted by soylentgreen
Or maybe in either case, we need to consider the human-machine interface as the thing that must change?
So whatever we conclude from study, the premise of human-machine interface being inadequate must be confirmed. Why making the study at all if initial bias is confirmed no matter the outcome?
Originally Posted by soylentgreen
Get 100 x 3-man crews, and put them in a multi-day full-experience simulator.
If you crash in the simulator, you can restart. Nonavailability of this feature in real life is very important factor when proverbial hits the fan and largely increases chance of inadequate response and panic.
Originally Posted by soylentgreen
Fullt-time AOA sensors.
While they are demanded by certification standards, mother nature has shown total indifference to righteous demands of outraged public that demands the letter of the certification laws be followed. There is no AoA probe that will work well and reliable both at 1 kt and 0.82 Mach. Make fame and fortune by inventing one.
Originally Posted by soylentgreen
From this study, we calculate the ultimate data point: what % of crews survive. And perhaps more interestingly: what % of crews survive for the right reasons.
So wealth of data available to make good case studies out of a few occurrences is just thrown away to make one-or two conclusions out of very small sample statistics? I'm glad BEA took different path.
Originally Posted by Petrolhead
No Clandestino, the radar had not been set up correctly:
At least you could have properly credited your quotes to
Popular Mechanics article mainly based on Jean-Pierre Otelli book. Monsieur Otelli had valid commercial reasons to make his book a bit more sensationalist than very technical and dry BEA report on AF447 since sales figures are of more practical value to any author than truth.
Fact that CM1 changed the mode of WX absolutely does not imply it was set incorrectly! It is perfectly normal to change range, elevation and gain to get the complete picture of weather systems ahead!
Originally Posted by Petrolhead
On the Airbus it is possible to have the radar on but not displaying anything - that was my point.
As it is possible on each and every radar with wx brightness adjustment. All of them nowadays come with such a feat so it is possible to set it too low on any wxrad equipped aeroplane. What is the point of singling out the Airbus?
Interim report number two was published on 30. Nov 2009. By that point, it had been clear from AF447 ACARS messages its pitots were blocked. Analysis of 13 similar incidents in cruise was made and all of them happened near the storms but never inside the convective cloud.
Interim report number 3 was issued at 29.07.2011. FDR and CVR were found and analyzed. They absolutely confirmed conclusions of interim2: UAS events happen near the storm tops, not in them. AF447 was avoiding the weather well, G trace shows only light turbulence as speed dropped to unrealistic values, quickly reducing to no turbulence at all. That's definitive proof that no storm penetration occurred!
Originally Posted by Nemrytter
They did - and a bad one at that. Depending on the statistics you use the storm cloud formation that they encountered was in the 'top' 1-3% of all storm clouds in that region during the last 6 years. Cloud-tops up to FL600, temperatures below -90C and very strong convection. Not a great place to fly.
That contradicts the BEA report. What is the source for this statement?
Originally Posted by Cool Guys
If the pilot recognized that the mode change disabled the AOA protection and the consequences having no AOA protection I do not think he would have pulled the stick fully back prior to the plane becoming stalled.
That's beyond reasonable doubt.
Originally Posted by Cool Guys
The plane was in a non optimum state, the computer recognized this state and implemented some counter measures to supposedly keep the plane flying.
Plane did no such thing. Aeroplane keeps flying out of its own accord and no matter the law, it remains aerodynamically the same. Protections are discarded so their untimely application based on false data does not chase the aeroplane out of envelope or into the ground.
Originally Posted by Cool Guys
A modern computer has a lot of processing power and lots of available memory allowing for a complex program.
Complexity still does not imply intelligence.
Originally Posted by Cool Guys
In complex automated applications we now implement touch screens with pictorial representations of the equipment.
While being exposed to constant 1G acceleration. That's the luxury we don't have in the aeroplanes.
Originally Posted by Good Guys
In this case a message indicating the mode has changed was announced and it is up to the pilot to know the resulting complex changes to the flight controls.
One look at PFD is sufficient.
Originally Posted by Good Guys
A display with a pictorial view of the plane with the elevators color changing from green to orange would be a good start.
Painting the elevator actuators yellow is already reserved for flight controls failure!
Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll
does the airbus have a PITCH HOLD mode(selectable by human pilot) for the autopilot?
PITCH HOLD is flight director mode. Airbus doesn't have it. Airbus FD has less modes than those fitted to modern turboprops. It's not a bad thing.
Originally Posted by DOVES
I had seen on my radar a chain of cumulus nimbus clouds
Me too. Today. Both our experiences are completely irrelevant and absolutely unrelated to AF447. RTF report.
Originally Posted by ironbutt57
In normal law the aircraft maintains attitude selected by last stick I put, within certain boundaries
It maintains flightpath. Constant pitch is consequence of neutral stick and constant speed.
Originally Posted by Nemrytter
As I said on the last page: They flew right into the middle of one of the most intense storms seen in that region in the past 6 years.
Originally Posted by nemrytter
you know bad weather doesn't necessarily mean turbulence
If bad weather definition encompasses fog, true. Active storm cells always come with a lot of turbulence.