For everyone who thinks PF blundered in 'neglecting to turn off his FD', remember the drill, and try to focus on when the crew became sufficiently sure of UAS to mention it. For to turn off the FD without knowing if UAS drill obtains, remember that in an emergent situation, it is very difficult to consider 'options' rather than pressure one's self to act decisively. The PF did not turn off his AP, either. It remained for the Captain to switch it off mere seconds before the impact. Please know that in the first several seconds, the solution rapidly lost focus for anyone, even you. It is clear that the plot became lost for both quite rapidly, even PNF lost his confidence quickly.
To follow a drill, one must first establish the need for it. It is not wrong to say that once these pilots got behind, catching up became extremely difficult. The FD seems seductive enough to have tempted PF, and the counter intuitive SW was no help. The planning for this "common" event (UAS), at the program level, seems to me to be arbitrary, even haphazard. The complexity of the challenge was in so many ways artificially induced; at the time when one needed simple, one was deluged, and having no training in the necessary skillset seems to me to be wildly negligent on the part of both Airline and Airframer.
Comes Captain, and he too is immediately drenched in a deluge of data, to the extent that he did not notice some truly simple things.
Is there a ready explanation for the very smooth line of THS increase to max, vice a more herky response to actual (commanded) pilot inputs? It looks graphically as though the THS was deploying to a "target" position, independent of pilot command?
Last edited by Lyman; 10th Jul 2012 at 21:48.