Their (BEA) role is to investigate accidents with the sole objective of improving aviation safety. To do this they:
- Obtain and assemble factual information regarding the accident
- Analyze the factual information
- Reach a conclusion on findings of the cause or probable cause
- Make safety recommendations.
Now granted PJ2 and Dozy did some SIM work to look at whether or not recovery was possible (it appeared to be) and Owain Glyndwr did analysis depicted in graphical charts which indicated recovery was theoretically possible. However, this is not information that can be construed factual unless actual flight trials were conducted in an A-330-200 aircraft to support/confirm the theoretical findings of SIM and analysis............This is why speculative information or theory based information shouldn't enter into a failure report out, it could be right or it could be wrong.
100% with you
Hazelnuts
It is entirely possible that deletion of the words 'througout the demonstration' was thought to be editorial, non-substantive. In any case, those changes had nothing to do with AF447.
As I said, it maybe just me, and it's certainly not worth a lot of discussion, but regardless of whether they intended it to be just editorial, for me, as a one-time designer, that editing changes the S/W duration requirement from conditional [i.e.linked to a prescribed demonstration technique] to mandatory without explicit or implicit time limits. But as I said its not worth an argument.
I don't really see why the logic that AoA vanes are not reliable below 60 kts should have any effect on problems with untoward stall warnings near lift off. Unreliable AoA signals because of dynamic effects yes, but that is a different problem.
With my interpretation of CS25 if it is flying you believe the AoA signal(s) and latch the S/W until the AoA comes back below the threshold and is confirmed to be so. Airbuses have a logic that changes the laws from ground to flight modes, so why are people debating complicated 60 kt and WoW combinations?