Indarra,
The stall recovery issue
A number of respected posters (such as PJ2 #127, #145, #165 and Owain Glyndwyr #148, #149 and there are others) have made a case for the possibility that the aircraft could have been recovered after the stall. BEA is in effect saying that it is only interested in what happened until departure from the flight envelope. It’s saying that while maybe or maybe not the aircraft would have been recoverable subsequently, the issue is, in effect irrelevant, because it didn’t cause the departure from the flight envelope.
IMO, the role of the accident investigation authority (BEA, NTSB, etc.) seems to be misunderstood at times. Their role is to investigate accidents with the sole objective of improving aviation safety. To do this they:
- Obtain and assemble
factual information regarding the accident
- Analyze the
factual information
- Reach a conclusion on findings of the cause or probable cause
- Make safety recommendations.
Now granted
PJ2 and
Dozy did some SIM work to look at whether or not recovery was possible (it appeared to be) and
Owain Glyndwr did analysis depicted in graphical charts which indicated recovery was theoretically possible. However, this is not information that can be construed factual unless actual flight trials were conducted in an A-330-200 aircraft to support/confirm the theoretical findings of SIM and analysis. For example, the AA Flt.191 out of ORD went down in an asymmetrical stall shortly after liftoff. The NTSB never addressed if the plane could have been recovered satisfactory but concentrated, based on factual investigation how the accident got to this point in the first place. Afterwards, at least two university studies concluded the plane was recoverable. However, approximately 30 pilots when confronted with the problem in a SIM failed to recover the airplane. This is why speculative information or theory based information shouldn't enter into a failure report out, it could be right or it could be wrong.
The non-recognition of altitude loss
Similarly a couple of posters have expressed surprise that the BEA’s report does not particularly pick up the crew’s evident ignorance of the descent down to 10,000. Some have made the suggestion that they only noticed when one digit came off the digital display. Again, I am wondering, ever so gently, whether the failure to highlight this disadvantage of a digital altimeter versus an analogue one, was also influenced by a BEA desire to keep FURTHER pressure off Airbus Industrie.
Digital verses Analog - Well, take a look at the NW B-727 accident during climb out of JFK on December 1, 1974, also a stall accident. In this accident the analog altimeter didn't help either. In fact, I wonder if, at that time, digital altimeters were available, if some people would have concluded a digital altimeter would have helped.
Just some thoughts to consider....