Originally Posted by
syseng68k
Just because you believe it, doesn't make it good system design.
I never said it was!
The point I was getting at was that not only was there a clear reference to the speed-based inhibition in the report (which made the assertion that the BEA was covering for Airbus's system design incorrect), but also that if other manufacturers' types exhibit similar behaviour, then again it relates to a design issue in general and not one specific to Airbus.
Now, according to the report this aspect of the design appears to have been instituted because of potential failures of the AoA vanes at takeoff leading to a false stall warning - which would present a hazard close to the ground (this also means that the suggestion of adding WoW switch to the trigger inputs wouldn't work). Essentially this accident has provided a secondary worst-case scenario where the inhibition can mislead a troubleshooting process. You and I both know this is complicated stuff, don't we?
(Which reminds me - I should pick up my 68k assembler revision soon...)