Lonewolf 50 in Post#265 made an excellent suggestion:
For anyone interested:
If you go to the tech log forum, you will find the following point excerpted from the BEA report.
The UAS (Unreliable AirSpeed) procedure memory item of turning off the FD's was not accomplished. (FD = Flight Director).
There are even some handy pictures and graphs that show when the FD was receiving good data, and when it wasn't. Mind you, neither pilot was aware of when it was good and when it was bad, but given the procedure as stated, they should not have needed to.
To make it even easier for those interested, here are the memory items:
There has been considerable discussion in the Tech Log regarding whether or not the safe conduct of the flight was impacted or not in the case of AF447 at cruise. Ultimately, flying pitch and power and/or getting out the pitch and power tables after checking and completing the memory list items would have saved the day.
Additionally, a great deal of information regarding the A330-200 is given in this presentation:
http://www.smartcockpit.com/data/pdf...t_Controls.pdf
An interesting article by Boeing can be found here:
Aero 08 - Erroneous Flight Instrument Information
Happy reading !!!