The flight tests did not go beyond approach to stall. The presenters opined that recovery from the developed stall is out of the envelope and that recovery is highly doubtful, even with proper actions. i.e. certification does NOT require recovery from a developed stall.
What Owain has theorized tells me that "doubtful" is a dubious vedict. He pointed out that from the data available, THS and elevators still had lift and authority. That supports the idea that recovery is possible, but what isn't certain is the altitude penalty paid to recover. (Though some estimates can be made). As note previously, they became, once stalled, two test pilots not well briefed on what they were testing ...
and didn't know they were now in that role.
It seems as if the FDs, when 'valid', were reacting to the existing rates which is not the way I expect - ie 'Flight Followers' rather than 'Flight Directors'.
Confuses me as well. Makes sense to me that FDs are to be selected OFF when UAS is encountered. Back to flying attitude and power ... old school flying.
Correct. This is probably the most confusing part about the FD logic. The FDs are withdrawn automatically during unreliable airspeeds and the FMA modes are lost. If two airspeeds erroneously agree, then the FDs will reappear with present HDG and instantaneous VS. In the confusion of the moment, it appears to me that this crew then followed these new FD modes.
The first line of the Memory items of the "Unreliable speed Indication / ADR Check Proc" AP/FD .... Off was never accomplished.
It doesn't help to solve the problem when the FDs keep reappearing with erroneous guidance.
Arrrgggh!
For PJ2, since you've spent some time actually training AB3xx pilots:
You seem skeptical that the instrument scan of the two pilots on the flight deck at the time, heavily dependent upon the FD. Do you find very many pilots who go through your training sessions to be what I might call "FD" dependent? Do the training scenarios give you the latitude to find out where their scans are strong, and where they are weak?
It would appear that if one pilot is too heavily dependent on the FD, (PF in this case), that increases the problem the other pilot has in helping the PF get back into the game. (If I am making comments to him based on a scan of nose and wings, and he is following his FD, maybe we have a chance for confusion?)
If that "FD boresight" were in progress (guessing) then my understanding of some "why did they do that" is somewhat improved.
But only partly.
PNF appears to have maintained something of an instrument scan, in re altitude at least, as he was working (in vain) to correct PF's various errors. (Note: seems that he'd have helped more by making sure the memory item of disconnecting FD was accomplished).
What many of us are saying is that FD 're-enable' should either be inhibited without a deliberate selection by crew OR, less desirable, it should re-engage in 'acquire selected altitude' mode, although this latter could cause problems if slow and below that altitude.
Seems that the former is the more desirable.