When that occurs the V/S or FPA is synchronized with the aircraft parameter, whatever it happens to be at the time of re-engagement. From there, the pilot makes an appropriate selection such as OPEN CLB/DESC, or, for immediate altitude hold, setting the V/S to zero, etc. (Another way to put it...V/S or FPA are simple, selected (ie, not managed), modes - the FDs could not "know" what "1400fpm" or "6000fpm" was for...it just reflected current conditions, from which selections may or may not be made).
Interesting!
Is that behaviour known and clear to an average AB Crew?
Technically I can see the logic behind but on the other hand that could indeed be somewhat misleading if the behaviour is not properly understood by the Crew. And indeed it appears the behaviour was not clear to them because after the intial rapid climb one could conclude they followed the 1400fpm of the FP.
It might at least be a good idea to automatically disconnect the FD in the same way as the AP in case of UAS so that it deliberately has to be reengaged. This might help a crew that failed to properly follow the procedure for whatever reason.
Altogether I do not really share the feeling that the report put too little emphasis on the FD. These reports are always very indirect in language and considering that I felt they highlighted the FD rather prominently. To me the report implies most of the committee also had the impression that the FD played an important role especially during the extermely relevant first minute of the incident.
After that things were pear shaped anyway and recovery was getging more and more unlikely. Once they were at 40° AoA things were set firmly for a bad ending. (Anyone trained in doing a 45° Nose dive at 30kFt in a 200t airliner at night in IMC with uncertainty about validity of instrument readings?)