Hardly a "tiptoe dance". It gets mentioned, but given that the design is now a successful one that has proven itself in safety terms, it's rightly mentioned at the appropriate point and left there.
I'd say the report (admittedly on a quick rather than thorough reading) is fairly even handed - the implicit primary thrust of it is towards the industry who left these pilots so ill-prepared rather than hanging the pilots themselves out to dry. The sequence of mis-steps is long, detailed and painful to read, but at no point is it suggested that this was the fault of the crew in isolation. The manufacturer comes in for censure for the way it handled certification of the Thales pitot tubes and disseminated information when the first problems occurred. Bear in mind the fact that as a civil service report it had to use very dry language and I'd say it stands up very well.
Regarding "AP OFF" at that time - well, the tendency in a situation like that is to try everything. The procedures do call for various automatic systems to be explicitly disabled and as we know, none of those procedures were followed. I wouldn't be surprised if the Captain wasn't simply taking a belt-and-braces approach to the problem. None of the DFDR traces from the point of automatic disconnect are consistent with autoflight re-engagement so ultimately it was a futile gesture, but it probably made sense to him at the time. If you're attempting an implication that autoflight was engaged at any point after the initial upset, then "clutching at straws" is putting it mildly!
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 6th Jul 2012 at 19:55.