I would just like to urge all Airbus pilots to read BEA's AF447 Final Report. It is an education, plugs holes in our understanding and illuminates many areas left grey or fuzzy by our training. It took me about 7 hours to read and made me more aware than ever that aviation is still very much a work-in-progress, that there are still major problems or deficiencies in design, regulation, company procedure, training, checking, simulators, flight safety reporting, ATC infrastructure, ergonomics, even in meteorological knowledge. Once again good and honest pilots and people have perished so that the rest of us can live and learn.
If the PF in the right seat, once the AP disconnected, had done nothing except hold the wings level and the pitch at 2.5 degrees until the ADRs kicked in again with some sensible readings, for about 60 confusing, ECAM flashing seconds, we probably wouldn't have even heard about it. All the PNF had to do was silence the bloody aural, disconnect the FDs and monitor the pitch and roll on his PFD like a hawk.
It took me 7 hours to read the Report and discover why that didn't happen. Of course anyone on PPrune who has followed the threads and read the Preliminary and Interim Reports would already know most of it but the Final puts a lot of flesh and insight on those bones.
My own area of concern is the absence of a Captain on the flight deck and the Report has quite a lot to say on the subject, including a CRM Training recommendation. Personally, I don't think it goes far enough. I believe the travelling public, once the Long Haul stuff started, has been short changed by the operators. For economic reasons, they deemed, with the blessing of the Authorities, that **** only happens below FL200 and that there were no status and role problems with two F/Os sitting together in the cruise. I am afraid AF447 calls that comfortable assumption into question. **** certainly can happen above FL200 and, for the AF skipper, it happened very fast. One and half minutes, to be precise.
I believe a pilot with the status, role, rights and duties, and salary, of a Captain should be in the left seat of an aircraft at all times. Period. Try convincing those surrounding the President of even the most impoverished banana republic that it is OK, in cruise we don't have the money to pay for a full Captain to be on the watch. Flying 300 passengers safely, to the best working practice possible, is flying 300 Presidents. This argument has nothing to say about the proficiency or professionalism of F/Os, which is taken for granted and may well exceed a Captain's. It is simply about responsibility, about having a legitimate person in the hot seat for when and where the buck stops. CRM improvements, more emphasis on briefings, more training for F/Os, all suggest some mystification at work to conceal a less than optimum crew configuration.
I was a bit surprised by how the Report quickly covered the analysis of the failure of the crew to recover from the stall once the horizontal stabiliser had reached its 13 degrees position, presumably still in Alternate 2B law. What could have been done, were the Elevators enough, was Auto Pitch trim still available? I would have expected a recommendation for some very defined jet upset training procedures.
But my main purpose here is not to initiate debate or even to ask any questions. I would simply urge you to read this Report if you are an Airbus pilot. For what it's worth, I have 12 years flying A330/340, 27000+ hours, and 2 months to go to retirement at 65. As a pilot I have always strived for excellence and only ever achieved average. And this Final Report has taught me a lot.