Thanks IT, got the full CVR appendix and others.
As many here expected, a combination of training, CRM, and the control law reversions/displays all played a role in the tragedy.
I shall cut the crew a bit of slack. Not a helluva lot, but I have to look at their experience and previous training. And then there's the belief by a few that the "system" will take care of them.
I shall not cut the FBW mechanization a single atom of slack, nor the associated lack of clear displays to the crew as to what they had available ( so-called protections) nor basic steering guidance for the crew that had thousands of hours using the AP and not actually flying the jet. Don't mean to be harsh, but it's what I feel.
This will be a landmark accident report in terms of recommendations and findings and.....
My prayers are that we shall see improved training, improved CRM and maybe some changes in the reversion sequences of the FBW systems when the air data sensors fail.