Originally Posted by ECAM_actions
To invalidate the stall warning on airspeed alone is stupid.
Originally Posted by BEA, final report on AF447, page 44
If the CAS measurements for the three ADR are lower than 60 kt, the angle of attack values of the three ADR are invalid and the stall warning is then inoperative. This results from a logic stating that the airflow must be sufficient to ensure a valid measurement by the angle of attack sensors, especially to prevent spurious warnings.
Plugging WoW into stall warning computer would make it more complicated, adding one more point of possible failure. Is 60 kt really too low cut-out for widebody?
Originally Posted by RR NDB
And this unavailability is AN ABSURD! It is VERY EASY, (REPEAT: VERY EASY) to process the information in order to HELP THE CREW ALLOWING TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUE, IMMEDIATELY!
BEFORE ANY CONTAMINATION OF AVIONICS WITH GARBAGE!
It is not easy in this universe where computers haven't moved from algorithms that can be broken down to simple IF...THEN; it is impossible. There are lines of code helping the FBW computers reject false air data if one computer doesn't tell the same story as the other two (which has shown its dark side at Perpignan) or there is such a rapid change in parameters that it's physically impossible but it takes intelligence to recognize if the combination of airspeed and normal acceleration is incompatible with sustained flight and yet aeroplane is flying, then there must be something wrong with the indications.
Originally Posted by RR NDB
To put (and maintain) in crew shoulders the responsibility to do the diagnosis (as Airbus SAS paper in UAS issue put) is IMO a GRAVE ERROR.
Every modern passenger transport aeroplane experiencing unreliable air data will throw a host of undue warnings. Warning computers are not intelligent and are not supposed to be, they just monitor parameters and cry out when pre-programed thresholds are exceeded. Have a look what happened to
Aeroperu or
Birgenair when air data become unreliable. They were 757s. Not made in Toulouse. It is all very nice for PPRuNers or investigation boards to ask for better UAS detection and resolution systems but without some creative genius coming with the idea of how they should be made, we won't get far.
Originally Posted by grity
is it accepted in the flying comunity to loose the control in this case?
Seemingly everything is possible with de-structured crew. Love that postmodernist terminology in the accident reports... not.
Originally Posted by aguadalte
I guess that would be an "evidence" of Airbus Industrie's misconception of the system...
Too bad this "evidence" did not make it into recommendations. Conspiracy? Recognition that non-interconnected sticks did indeed prevent CM1 from recognizing that all the mess was mainly CM2 induced is so low down the causality chain to be significant?