Other A330 pilots encountered similar senarios without major incident because they flew attitude and power setting. How many times does a "STALL STALL" warning have to go off before someone reduces Angle of Attack? It seems the SO took the low level wind-shear response (TOGA plus full aft stick) and assumed the aircraft was in normal mode. Very poor CRM and the lack of captaincy are other factors. Yes the Airbus has "hiddens" such as non moving Thrust levers, non moving stab trim wheel, independent side sticks but at the end of the day when was the last time those in the flying seats had recovered from a real Stall in a real aircraft? 5000 h of automated Airbus flight and maybe 250h of real flying at the beginining of the SO' and FO's JAR Integrated course training......
Ten years before this accident, Airbus Chief Test Pilot Capt W Wainwright wrote an article on Stall recovery - it is doubtful many Airbus pilots have read it. Had the AF447 crew been taught and applied these techniques history would be different:
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct...NBc9_0_SR-U9Sg
We know there were many factors aggravating the situation but responsibility lies with the pilots, the airline, the manufacturer, the training system and the regulators. How much will be judged to have the greater share will depend on honesty, openness and sadly politics. I hope we can learn from the mistakes made and ensure a safer flying future by improving pilot selection, training, and mentoring, developing CRM/SMS so it is of real value and not a box ticking , white-wash exercise. I hope AF447 will lead to a clarifying of systems, improvment to the automation/pilot interface, designing controls that keep all the flight crew in the loop.
Cost cutting shares some of the blame: Since the 1990s Long haul operators have moved from having Two experienced Crews (2 capts, 2 FOs) to a Cruise Pilots (SO's with no flying below 10 to 15 thousand feet).
This combined with what Airbus claims is just 3h hands on flying a year for most Long Haul Captains plus an EU system of zero to hero in 250h (with multiple guess aeronautical knowledge) before 1000s of hours watching automation on FBW jets must also account in part for the AF447 FO and SO interaction and actions.
Of course other maufacturers aircraft have stalled with sad loss of life. If it were not for the Airbus protection systems, the accident rates could well be higher. But, for some observers, AF447 is Airbus' Titanic moment. Even if not expressed directly by the Company, the "unsinkable" / "unstallable" claims made by some pilots have echoed around Simulator halls and online forums for years. It might be true 99% of the time until an iceberg/pitot ice event is poorly handled.
Traditionally, Pilots are entrusted with baby sitting the automation. By bombarding a pilot with claims throughout his training and career, that the automation is better/ more reliable/ more efficient than the pilot can lead to a mind set where the computer baby sits the pilot and a transfer of responsibility occurs.
"This machine will get me out of trouble if I just trust the alpha protection and do what I did in the SIM"
"OK, the automatics have given up and handed me manual control, don't panic!, what's the attitude and thrust setting, strange speed indications! , rate of roll/yaw pitch?, cross check with alternative EFIS and standby instruments, is that weather related turbulence or stall/mach buffet?, The stall warning is going off, fly pitch and power......."