Originally Posted by bubbers44
They just needed an experienced pilot flying, not them. Sorry. That is how I see it.
CM2 2936 TT, 807 on 330/340
CM1 6547 TT, 4479 on 330/340
Capt 10988 TT, 1747 on 330/340
When is the pilot experienced enough to be safe?
Why do the certifying authorities allow pilots consider pilots with 200 hrs to be safe riding a RHS in airliner and consider 1500 hrs enough for command - provided pilots are properly trained and checked out?
What do you see that no competent aviation authority can't?
Is there any study showing less experienced pilots to be more incident/accident prone or that high-timers are immune to certain types of mistakes?
Originally Posted by bubbers44
Monitoring an autopilot for thousands of hours does not make you a pilot.
What does? Capability to fly aeroplane manually? Would perchance ability to comprehend what is going on from the cues on the instrument panel be more useful to AF447 crew?
Originally Posted by grity
is there any automatismus for the elevator to reakt against the moment (--->pull) of the increasing engines ???
Yes. In normal and alternate laws, stick free, FBW Airbi are flightpath stable so they'll try to keep the flightpath no matter whether the disturbance comes from turbulence or from power coupling. Also they move elevators to satisfy G command, if you slam the thrust levers and get classic pitch-power coupling while pulling on the stick, elevators will deflect less to produce commanded G.
Sounds complicated but feels very natural. You set the nose where you want it to be without thinking about normal acceleration and roll rates.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
In post 1453, A33Zab posted the content of a Flight Global article relating to the AF447 human factors. This was based on an April presentation by Former BEA deputy chief Jean Pariès who heads human factors consultancy Dédale
Now there is a very, very good example why flight safety should never, ever be left to commercial enterprises. Some good and valid ideas are mixed with radical departures from what is currently accepted to be true - which wouldn't be bad in itself if it were supported by some verifiable research, instead of I-say-so's and unnecessarily complicated graphs.
Originally Posted by mm43
Does this mean that the HF response will be a complete re-write and a re-jig of the aviation industry's approach to safety?
If Dedale SAS France has it its way - yes. Hopefully not. IMHO improvement is needed, complete rebuild, not yet.
Originally Posted by RR/NDB
Role of A/C
Hi,
Pariès cited 16 events similar to AF447, all of which showed poor understanding, rare implementation of unreliable airspeed procedures and stall warnings which were "perceived but mostly not believed".
Monsieur Paries cites 16 events without specifying when they happened, what were the circumstances and whether they pertain to A330/340 at all. So much for the "role of the aircraft"
BEA interim2 lists 36 occurrences of unreliable airspeed on 330/40, 13 of which were available for detailed analysis. It also makes clear there were five cases of descend following the stall warning - in controlled manner, obviously.
So are we to believe BEA in this dilemma because it is official investigating body?
Nope, not just because of that. BEA has provided pretty comprehensive reference about the occurences. Aeroplanes are listed by s/n, which can be used in conjunction with DoF to find out which were the flights affected, making its claims very verifiable. Monsieurs Paries references have, for the time being, been zilch.
Originally Posted by bubbers44
I have never fllown with a side stick but no Boeing pilot at FL350 would pull back to the stops if he lost his airspeed and autopilot,
You are right, because
this Boeing MD-80 was stalled at FL330 and didn't lose a thing, but is 20 FLs such a big difference? Is the type relevant at all?
This Tu-154 was lost near FL400,
this CRJ 200 was lost as the crew tried to cling at FL410 while being blissfully unaware what "backside of the power curve" means. At Stony Point B727 was lost that never got above FL248.
Originally Posted by bubbers44
No monitoring pilot would let the pilot flying do it either.
Monitoring who or what;
Dynasty 006 was a Boeing, too.
Originally Posted by buubers44
Is this really how Airbus pilots normally fly?
If you read interim2, you would have known there were 36 recorded cases of Airbuses 330/340 suffering from UAS and going into alternate laws, with crews handling the situation without any damage to airframe or injury to passengers, so your question would be completely superfluous.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
all accusations of such behaviour were lies concocted by the defence team of M. Asseline and those who followed him.
Wrong!
People who keep maligning FBW & FADEC when discussing the Habsheim disaster with blatant disregard to facts, don't have anything to do with Michael Asseline's defense and definitively have no his support. Capt Asseline has accepted the BEA findings. He was no stupid yet he has flown aeroplane full of passengers, at an airshow overhead the grass airfield where he has never flown the display before, without checking for obstacles, executing flyby low and slow. In retrospect it was very stupid thing to do. Analysis of the process that led him to belief it is acceptable to perform such a seemingly idiotic thing and warning every pilot about it was supposed to be the main safety lesson of the accident. Diverting the focus from it by blaming the computers, either through ignorance or agenda, is irresponsible at the very least.
Originally Posted by NeoFit
I am not belonging M. Asseline team and those who followed him, AFAR, it seems to me that pilots must be informed about the specificities of the vessel they are handling.
Heavier than air, fixed wing aircraft specifically dislike being flown with low energy, colloquially known as: low and slow. It hurts them a lot.
Originally Posted by mm43
it would appear that the crew had no idea that the Alpha protections had been lost.
At 2:10:22 CM1 called out "Alternate law, protections (law/low/lo). Anyway, what's the use of alpha prot in cruise? Other crews lost it too and lived to tell the story.
Originally Posted by SeenItAll
But this guy was an Airbus pilot, and under Normal Law, isn't pulling the side stick to the stops quite permitted because Alpha Protect would limit any pitch change to prevent LOC?
Yes, but alpha prot gives you maximum possible climb performance, there's absolutely no reason to use it when terrain is not a factor. Pilots should be constantly able to tell whether they are flying high or low.
Originally Posted by mm43
Perhaps the centrifuge simulators of tomorrow may help to reinforce what it feels like when the aircraft is maneouvered in abnormal conditions.
What is so remarkable about AF447 but is mostly glossed over, is that loss of control looked extremely benign on the inside. There were no extreme attitudes, no rapid attitude changes, no high or low G, no spin, nothing. Just unwinding altimeters. How would centrifuge training help pilot feel what AF447 crew felt is way beyond my comprehension, unless we are talking about stopped one.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
Bubbers, that's *precisely* what the Birgenair 757 captain did.
Actually, with connected controls, who made which input is always matter of conjecture. Of course capt was designated PF, so chances he made the final pull are extremely high. On FBW Airbus, there is no mistaking who did what with the stick.
Originally Posted by Flyinheavy
As far as I remember the Birgen Air accident was mainly caused by failure of shutting off the A/T system, which by design took thrust to idle because of the false overspeed sensed by blocked pitot. The FO very well was aware of the situation, but it seemed to be also a cultural issue that he did not take control.
Here:
quick refresher on Birgenair, by the time it departed the envelope, autopilot and autothrottle were off.
Originally Posted by infrequentflyer
The problem of crews failing to recognize stall, pulling up into stalls, pulling back through stall warnings, and failing to correct the other guy doing it is not new and didn't start with fbw and sidesticks.
Correct. Panic pull has been with us since there were first aeroplanes, it has nothing to do with type, sidesticks did not eliminate it or made it worse, also triggering condition can differ but result is exactly as you have described.
It cannot be cured by flying more raw data manual approaches. To prevent it it is essential to have a pilot that doesn't panic when startled. Is it achievable through training? Damned if I know.
Originally Posted by Linktrained
Some months ago somebody asked whether there were any training aircraft fitted with S/S.
F-16D
Originally Posted by Linktrained
I read that the specification for training aircraft states, IIRC, that dual controls were required for what I think, was professional instruction. It specifically stated that swing-over controls were not acceptable.
Because 60 years ago it was legal to train pilots on aeroplanes with single throw-over yoke, such as early Bonanzas had. Took a while to realize it wasn't the smartest thing to do.