Originally Posted by mm43
This link to the high altitude operations power point file at flightsafety.org has possibly been posted previously, but well worth a look.
It absolutely is worth far more than a cursory look! Its salient points 1) there's a lot of difference between approach to stall recovery and stall recovery, 2) mach tuck and coffin corner are no longer factors on modern turbofan transports 3) most of the high altitude upsets are pilots induced, get cheerfully ignored during a many PPRuNe discussion, not just AF447.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
In 5 years we lost 5 aircraft in my squadron with 11 dead crewmembers. We looked detailed into those accidents, and none of those gizmo´s i mentioned would have saved their day, not saying they are superfluous though. Airmanship and common sense (with or without those gizmo´s) would have. That did not make them bad people or bad pilots, but it got them killed unfortunately.
(...)
No, but they did not recognize, that they were doing that final mistake.
Any similarity between your fallen comrades and the crew of AF447 is not coincidental. There's very, very little doubt that CM2 felt he was doing the right thing just as he was putting himself and everyone else on board just in the fate's line of sight. That's the stuff of what Greek tragedies were made.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
If your statement is something like sh*t happens, then that is not something i can accept as accident prevention handling.
Problem with some pilots are that they are spoiled and lazy. They never take the time to learn statistics properly. If every pilot understood it well, we would never have to discuss minima busting or taking off with snow on the wings and opportunities of having to learn from the colleagues who went from AME's objects of interest to pathologist's, would have been greatly reduced. AF447 was inevitable but there is a whole world of practical difference between once-a-year inevitable and once-in-ten-thousand-years inevitable. Statistics!
Originally Posted by Retired F4
With more gizmos or better training, what´s your answer?
Neither alone and not just that.
StEx has shown better understanding of A330 than many a PPRuNer decrying the beast's design when he said: "The machine does not isolate us from the great problems of nature but plunges us more deeply into them". All the fabulous acronimous stuff such as: EFIS, GNADIRS, FBW, AP, FD, ATHR, etc. are absolutely incapable of separating us from nature, bot human and in general sense, a little bit.
The panic pull is old and known quantity, for pilots wiling and able to face their enemy. Wolfgang Langewiesche has described it accurately in "Stick and Rudder". Adolf Galand himself was its prey at the very early stage of his career. Saving grace was he kept stick pressed hard against the backstop as the ground contact finally put an end to his spin and very low wing loading of his glider resulted in impact RoD so low to make the crash survivable. Lucky for him, not so for the allied pilots who strayed into center of his aiming reticle during WW2. Just shows it can happen to anyone and pilots who succumb to it are not necessarily the ones with "the wrong stuff".
Better training? Sure! Improve training in such a manner to assure that every pilot really understand what is trained. Make better initial pilot selection, both before first flying lesson and at joining the airline. Give no credit for experience, lest you want 27 000 hrs pilot getting so excited about his first real emergency that he runs out of fuel while preparing the landing or 25 000 hrs pilot failing to do basic crosscheck, putting his trust in the sole failed instrument and spinning his passenger jet during climbout.
That's pretty uneconomical, eh?
Originally Posted by CONF iture
The guy needs full attention on him - In need to correct or lecture each and everyone - Just glad I don't have to share a flight deck with that type of character ...
The guy tries to get as least personal as practicable. To this end, he tries to argue the points raised, not the people making it. He tries not to waste bandwidth by discussing completely unfounded arguments, just those that have some merit.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
How about that one?
AF definitively has training problems but then some AF crews have successfully negotiated AF447-like scenario in real life. Methinks problem lies with assuring that the pilots really understand what is trained and accept the training as useful and something to be relied upon when real life proverbial hits the fan. Basic airmanship might be an issue too. As once was said:
Originally Posted by David Learmount
You can always lead the pilot to the right path, but you can not always make him follow it.
Originally Posted by Roullisholandais
What do you think of the oscillations of the two last minutes ?
Oscillation after AP went offline is very significant... in radically different matter than some here suggest. CM2 has countered it quickly, decisively and successfully - proving he was looking at functioning attitude indicator at the time.
Originally Posted by PJ2
These days no captain should argue in the moment and may even thank the F/O later for saving the airplane, the headlines and the heartbreak for families.
For Finnegan's sake, it was always so! We just didn't call it CRM in the days of yore! Good captains needn't be told what CRM is and how it's good for them to practice it! They just filed it under "airmanship"!
Originally Posted by PJ"
Clearly I don't mean just when the F/O feels slightly uncomfortable with something the captain is doing, but in clear and present circumstances that warrant the action
Best advice, as usual, can be found on PPRuNe.
Originally Posted by
C441
If you think somethings not right, say so. If you think it's not right, it probably isn't. If it is right, you've just learnt something.
However, current state of AF447 CVR transcripts indicates the major CRM problem was no crew resource to manage.
Originally Posted by gums
My understanding is that "all" air data was unreliable except AoA, and AoA ( separate probe) was deemed unreliable due to low airspeed.
True, but it's not whole truth. It got unreliable when the aeroplane passed 41.5° alpha as the stick was held obstinately aft. Thirty seconds before that everything was valid, even the airspeed.
I'm speculating now, but my money is on the final findings being similar to
Peter Garrison's take on Colgan 3407.