Surely one very good way of the RN both maintaining and increasing Pilot (and maintainer) numbers would be to have some jets now? I assume that nobody is going to get sent stateside for an eight year period?
I've said this
before on this thread, but if we accept that the decision to go back to F35B and STOVL operations has been made (possibly for reasons of reducing training issues and getting a capability sooner as well as cost) then the issue now is how to get there?
Presumably it will be easier to prepare future CVF crews with the skills needed for STOVL operations than for CTOL ones? Add to that the very real possibility of embarking Harriers aboard
Illustrious/
Queen Elizabeth? Why can we not embark foreign Harriers?
Borrowing a few AV8Bs from Spain or Italy (particularly the former as they may be needing the UK to chip in to the bailout fund) would give us aircraft to train with, and a real capability. Alternatively (and since the US want us to have a carrier capability) lease a few AV8Bs (with support Memorandum of Understanding).
I have mentioned these ideas (and one or two others) on the
Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers" thread.
Why should any of this be seen as a U turn? Apart from the fact that there have been many U turns already, this would simply be changing the preparations for CVF. Instead of preparing for a CTOL future, preparing for a STOVL one. After all, the switch to F35C was used to help justify the binning of Harrier. This would be a chance for the politicians to be seen as in touch and able to respond to changing circumstances. Oh...! See my final paragraph about Groupthink.
Maybe I am a simple thicko, but surely the situation is that we currently have no STOVL aircraft, having binned them and having been told that CTOL is the future. Our Pilots are now mostly flying CTOL aircraft (Hornet/Super Hornet) stateside, at cost of HM Government. The US wish that we still had a carrier capability. We currently have a carrier capable of STOVL fixed wing operations, which will be true most of this decade. Other European nations are in possession of Harriers - despite current economic woes. RN fixed wing pilot numbers declined in recent years, which is now something the RN is trying to correct (what will these people fly when not stateside?).
Getting some carrier jets back ASAP will not just make the transition to CVF/F35 easier, but may be a matter of life and death. The SDSR assumptions have been proven wrong, and this decade looks like it will be full of chaos and violence. It would appear that sending a task group to the Gulf is still an
option - yet restrictive ROE that demand positive identification of targets and restrict the ability of shipborne weapon systems to deal with threats may prove lethal. The US is beefing up the defences of Minehunters etc in the Gulf. We are not, we are however sending an LPH to the Thames to acts as a platform for helicopters on an air defence role during the Olympics. Perhaps our politicians simply do not value our ships and sailors?
SDSR was a complete foul up. The Harrier/CVS capability was axed at the last minute by the Prime Minister, supposedly as the Chief of General Staff (now CDS) urged him to rip up the plans to cut Army numbers, but it would appear that those cuts are still going ahead. Neither the Army or RAF gained anything from these cuts. Is defence planning really a race to the bottom?
I have recently been reading a self improvement book called
Can Do by Dutch Psychologist Ben Tigglelaar. It is about making positive changes, not just by having intentions but also by understanding the role that situations ply in our behaviour, and that difficult situations are best countered by anticipating them and developing what he calls counter behaviour. There is a lot to it, much of which is applicable to organisations as well as individuals.
Is the behaviour we need in order to prepare for F35B operations to have jets embarked this decade? If we want to recruit more fixed wing Pilots (and retain existing ones) this decade then we need that to be an attractive option?
Another thing briefly mentioned is one of our major enemies in the MOD/defence, and other organisations - Groupthink. Mr Tigglelaar outlines following as characteristics of Groupthink, can you recognise any from the Harrier/Carrier arguments?
Not expressing your true thoughts and feelings
Consciously maintaining an illusion of unanimity
Investigating only a limited number of alternative solutions to a problem
Being extremely selective in looking for and applying external information
Speaking negatively about people outside the group
Rationalising decisions that were not particularly good
Not developing emergency scenarios