Personally if we argue about airworthiness of the MRA4 then surely the same issues will come up for the intro of the Rivet Joint.
One of the primary factors behind the MRA4 decision-making was the undisputed fact that both MoD and Ministers had been given detailed,
prior warning of the systemic failings that Haddon-Cave simply collated and reiterated. In MoD these warnings went unheeded for nigh on 20 years.
BEFORE the XV230 crash, Ministers were lied to by MoD and refuted these facts, in writing (esp. Lewis Moonie in 2003 and Adam Ingram in 2005/2006). Even
AFTER the event (May 2007), Ingram issued denials, as did his successor, Ainsworth (August 2007) the Air Staffs (December 2007). They ALL were proven 100% wrong.
It would be wrong to say it took this tragedy to open their eyes. MoD remained in full denial mode. What forced them to accept the facts was the adverse publicity and, dare I say it, the integrity of certain MPs. Also, key evidence MoD had denied the existence of had been made available, yet still they denied it; at one point (April 2003) even implying such documents were a fabrication. That this misleading of Parliament was a deliberate, conscious and illegal act, is beyond any doubt. The Government’s acceptance of the H-C Report, for all its flaws, was actually a scathing indictment of MoD’s behaviour.
But the mistake MoD and Government made was to continue to protect the guilty, while encouraging the scapegoating of those named by Haddon-Cave. The party line was; these people are no longer in post, so by definition there is no longer an airworthiness problem. A 5-year-old would be embarrassed at that argument. Undoubtedly, there was incompetence on a grand scale, but that is not an offence; rather it is a product of policies which relegated airworthiness to something that should be
waived if Time and Cost were at risk. (The main point in Haddon-Cave’s report, but which he attributed to his own investigations, omitting to say he was given written evidence dating the policy to 1991). Yet it was the incompetent (to different degrees) who were blamed, while those who
knowingly compromised safety and directed that false declarations be made, the minority, who were rewarded.
It is against this background that one should view MRA4, especially the nervousness and the unwillingness to sign off on airworthiness in the certain knowledge that you will be scapegoated if something goes wrong. This remains one of the biggest hurdles. The MAA can regurgitate perfectly good regulations all they want, but it is lack of leadership and management practices that need addressing.
To the best of my knowledge, Rivet Joint’s audit trail is not as irredeemably tainted as Nimrod’s. Yet.