Somebody earlier posted that we would not likely see an accident report. But they have been published in the past. As you read them you just shake your head and realize that there is a reason for stereotypes:
A-310 Nigeria Airways
http://www.aib.gov.ng/cia129.pdf
- “On long final, the descent was visual and manual. Since the wind was
not strong, the Captain did not pay attention to its direction but was only
preoccupied with avoiding the clouds. The aircraft crossed the threshold at
about 50ft high while the Captain claimed to be taking visual perspective to
left of the runway's centreline.”
On page 13 it states(pages are in the order of 15, 13, 17)…
- “The nose gear touched down shortly before the aircraft approached rapid-exit-taxiway intersection with the runway, the wide expanse of which gave the crew, the erroneous impression that the airplane was well in the middle of paved runway. This led the crew to keep this heading, forgetting everything to the right which was the general direction of the runway. Of course, there would be no lights ahead of them because the lights were to the right - the true runway direction. It was not surprising that the crew gave evidence as follows: ..........................we were seeing the lights then suddenly, we did not see the lights anymore."
- “The ATC tape recorder was unserviceable for about 17 months and was still unserviceable on the day of accident.”
- “The first contributory factor was the touchdown point which was displaced 82ft. left of the
centre-line and 2 degrees left of the runway direction. The second contributory factor was the open trench close to the runway shoulder which immediately trapped the left main landing gear in a bid to correct to the runway heading with right rudder.”
DC-10 touch and go crash Nigeria Airways(link no longer on website)
A DC-10 of Nigeria Airways doing touch and goes for a new captain on his first DC-10 captain flight on a where the visibility was about ½ mile(900 Meters). They landed long on the 10,000 foot plus runway due to a high approach and throttles not being fully closed, then a long time to lower the nose, then a long time to reconfigure, then suddenly the end of the runway noticed to be rapidly approaching out of the haze, then the throttles advanced by one crew followed by another wanting to stop using brakes and spoilers but not closing the throttles. Impact into non-frangible approach lighting caused a fire.
- “Foam was directed toward the fuselage roof and the fuel tanks were ignored. Fire services fought the fire for the first three minutes after which fire fighting was carried out over the next one hour twenty minutes with the use of sand and three shovels. “
A cargo carrying Nigeria Airways 707 with a smoke on board from a specific cargo pallet.
http://www.aib.gov.ng/cia04344.pdf
- “The Flight Engineer in the cockpit was the first to notice and comment on the strange odour he perceived. The Ground Engineer and the Load Master confirmed the presence of the smell and a throat irritation that they experienced for quite a while around them in the cargo compartment. The Flight Engineer was justified in getting angry with them for not notifying the cockpit from the moment they felt the unusual sensations.”
After the smoke evacuation checklist had been completed there is casual conversation about the climate in Nigeria and proper descent technique followed by laughter and the captain’s statement of “I want wine and will drink beer today”. No emergency was declared and the flight continued toward its destination 40 minutes away while another suitable airport was 10-15 minutes behind.
Eventually the master warning sounded and illuminated. It was cancelled immediately by the F/O without identifying it prior to cancellation. According to the report, “he apparently cancelled the warning and ran to ease himself”. The CVR quotes the F/O saying “I ran to urinate”.
A couple of minutes later, there was an explosion will subsequent loss of aircraft control. The Captain and F/E survived.
Boeing 737 at Kaduna 1995
http://www.aib.gov.ng/cia04354.pdf
“….gave the aircraft an inbound clearance with no delay for a locator approach unto runway 05 and passed on the 07:00 UTC weather report. Though, the initial landing clearance was for runway 05, the Captain requested to land on runway 23. He was reminded by the Air Traffic Controller that the wind was from 090 magnetic, but he still insisted on using the 23 approach. The Captain, therefore, accepted to land with a tailwind“(090/10).
“…. the threshold was sighted just 1 .5 miles to the left of the aircraft.
The First Officer asked the Captain "Can you make it to land from that
position?". The observer also suggested going on the downwind;
presumably to re-position the aircraft for landing on runway 05. There was
no response at all from the Captain and the approach was continued for
runway 23. The left turn was very steep and it took the aircraft to the left
of the runway centreline and a right correction was applied. The observer
had to shout a warning "Watch the wing" as the wings could have struck
the ground on the final approach.”
“The aircraft touched down at 2020 ft (615.85m) from the end of the
paved runway 05 after consuming 7820 feet i.e. 79.5% of the runway total
length. The Captain was reported to have used 1.8 and 1.6 EPR (Engine
Power Ratio) on the reversers. When a runway overrun became inevitable,
the Captain turned the aircraft to the left with the intention to take
advantage of the last rapid exit intersection to avoid the runway end lights.
At this juncture, the aircraft entered an uncontrollable skid. The
attendant turning moments inevitably forced the right wing to hit the ground, thus rupturing the fuel tanks and a huge fire erupted.” (Turn initiated at 76 knots)
“The fire fighting was ineffective for two reasons: Firstly, the volume of water and foam brought to the scene of the accident by the MAC 06 and Bedford trucks got finished in no time and secondly, the fire fighting technique employed by the firemen was wrong; rather than attacking the source of the fire, they were busy trying to curtail the spread of the fire.”
“The Flight Cockpit Management was very pitiable in that only the
Commander was treating the flight while the First Officer was only
interested In acting as a mobile relay station on the company frequency”
“Evidence from the Cockpit Voice Recorder, indicated that no landing
checks were carried out. The right seat scheduled first Officer was just too busy assisting in relaying messages between the ground dispatchers.”
“The alignment of the aircraft was not achieved until the aircraft was far beyond the threshold of the runway.”
“In the cockpit, there was another Pilot, a status of First Officer
occupying the jump seat as an observer. There seemed to be a rift between the Commander of this aircraft and the jump seat F/O . The jump-seat pilot claimed himself to be a member of the Nigeria Airways management, and hence superior to the Captain . The jump seat pilot went as far as hassling for the hotel suite that was reserved for the Captain the previous night on arrival at the hotel, the bad blood was still very much on the minds of both of them
that co-operation between them on the flight deck was rendered Impossible.”
`…a jump-seat pilot has no responsibility for the`flight and should not interfere with the conduct of the flight, but in this case he did comment and almost took over the approach briefings from the
Captain.”
“Records indicate that the attitude of the commander of this
aircraft towards other members of staff of the airline leaves a lot
to be desired.”
ILS U/S, ATC Radar U/S, FDR U/S
B737-200 destroyed at Kaduna
http://www.aib.gov.ng/reports/cia04365.pdf
QAM. 1600 UTC
QAN: 060/06Knots.
QBA: 600 meters.
QBB: 9000 meters.
QNY: Thick dust haze.
QMU: 30/03 Celsius.
QFE: 942 MBS.
QNH: 1017 EBB.
”…the Chief Pilot of Chanchangi Airline Ltd. Approached the Air Traffic Controller personally that he would like to fly around the circuit for a training flight. He was told that the visibility was 600 meters which was below the landing minima and was then advised against it. The Pilot then suggested that he would carry out a "Rejected Take-
Off' training.”
”At 15:37 UTC. He requested a take off clearance which was granted, and was directed to
proceed to the holding point of runway 05. At the holding point the pilot gave the number of souls on board as 24 and a fuel endurance of 4 hours.”
”This Boeing 737 aircraft in carrying out four rejected take off runs within an interval of twelve minutes, must have developed unacceptably high temperatures around the brake units that the upsurge of fire was virtually inevitable.”
”The aircraft was burnt to ashes in a fire that resulted from overheated brake units in the left landing gear.”
”Eye witness account had it that the fire truck was at first positioned on the right side of the airplane whereas, the source of the fire was on the left. Then they were directed to reposition on the left side and were then seen to be directing the nozzle spray to the top of the left wing instead of the left main-landing gear under the wing. It was noticeable that there was no sign or smell of foam agent around the aircraft and furthermore, the fire men also complained that the fluoro-protein foam compound was unstable and ineffective.”
The trancript of the communications between the aircraft and tower show that the pilot had to mention the word Fire 20 times before it was understood by ATC that the aircraft was on fire.
E110 at Kaduna(link on site no longer works)
Engine shut down prop not feathered, when copilot asked for 25% flap…full flap selected. Airpeed decayed, control lost.
“Crew coordination was practically not in existence and the first officer could not be adjudged to understand what his commander was doing at any particular time in this flight. Even when the commander had a callout, the approach of the copilot was rather casual and inconsistent. It is surprising to note that in the course of investigation the first officer could not confirm whether the landing gear was deployed at any particular phase of the flight.“
“…according to the captain, the first officers reactions and responses to his commands were not rational and logical.“
ADC Airlines DC-9(Nigerian Airline crash in Monrovia) on a 6,000 foot runway
http://www.aib.gov.ng/5nbbedc9.pdf
“When the aircraft was about 4nm away from the threshold of RWY-23, it had
descended to 400ft. The RWY was sighted at about 2.5nm, the aircraft crossed the threshold of RWY-23 at a slightly high altitude of about 150ft. A hard touch down was however made at about 3000ft from the threshold.”
“they should have anticipated and be prepared for the presence of water on the runway to decide whether or not to continue the landing -having crossed the threshold at a height of about 150' and with a speed close to 155 kts.”
“nowhere in the transcript was a formal read-out of the checklist found in the normal challenge-and response format.”
“The inaction of the spoilers probably explains why the aircraft bounced to a height of about 20' after the initial touch-down.”
BAC 1-11 at Port Harcourt
http://www.aib.gov.ng/okadabac11.pdf
“….the aircraft ran into a heavy downpour and could not execute ob-around
as aircraft was sin kina fast. But as he wanted to nave positive
contact with me runway, rte "chopped. power". “(all spelling errors from report).
“The aircraft made a hard landing, bounced up and made the second touchdown on its nose-wheel. About 82 meters after impact, the aircraft lost the nose gear assembly and fuselage nose section contacted the runway. About 600 meters after touchdown, the aircraft left the paved runway and ran into the trench on the runway shoulder.”
“The following three accidents had occurred at Port-Harcourt International
Airport within the last 24 months:
(A) Accident to the Airbus A-310 registered 5N-AUG on the 8th September,
1987.
(B) Accident to the Boeing 737 registered 5N-ANW on the 15th October,
1988.
(C) Accident to this BAC 1-11 registered 5N-AOT on the 7th September,
1989.
In all the three accidents, those horrid trenches along runway 03/21 escalated the hitherto landing incidents to total accidents. Out of the three accidents above only the Airbus was repairable.”
“The salvage exercise escalated the seemingly salvageable aeroplane to total
loss of hull. The Nigerian Airports Authority did not have the simplest means
of removing any type of wracked aircraft as its disposal at the station. The
operator hired two cranes of 40 and 50 tonne capacities to evacuate the
aircraft from the runway shoulder but the steel cables from the crane
booms virtually sliced the fuselage circumferentially.”
“For Borne(sic) years now, there had never been any good means of communications within the airport complex. information that would have been dispatched through the telephone are now being hand carried from the tower on the 8th floor to other Airport.”
“The elevator to the tower has not been working for years and the NAA is financially handicapped to effect any repairs. There is no telephone communication between the airport and Port-Harcourt township which is about 40 kilometres away. The radar has been out of service and-shut-down since December, 1987.”
“There was communication between the pilot and the tower, but the
ATC tape deck was not operating because the air conditioner which cools the
instrument room had broken down”
“The operator does not have a Company Operations Manual”
DC-9 Port Harcourt(7 years after the three accidents made worse by ditches)
http://www.aib.gov.ng/fmaaipb424.pdf
“The aircraft on final approach encountered adverse weather with change in wind speed and direction: 220° /09kts (headwind) in nil weather to 360° /05kts (tailwind) while the visibility was reducing in thunderstorm and rain.”
“Eyewitness accounts from the air traffic controllers and fire/rescue personnel stated that the airfield lightings were not on.”
“The crew continued the descent and went well below the Decision Altitude without having visual contact with the runway.The crew initiated a 'go-around' below the altitude of 204ft, which is 103ft below the Decision Altitude; the attempt of which was not successful.”
“There was no standard instrument call-out by the crew”
“At about 60m from the first impact, the aircraft rear fuselage impacted heavily with an exposed concrete drainage culvert where No.2 engine and the rear staircase of the aircraft were detached and lodged. The exposed concrete drainage structure is badly located and poses a real danger to aircraft landing on Runway 21.”
Let 410 at Calabar
http://www.aib.gov.ng/fmaaipb383.pdf
“…the crew reported to the control tower that they were having electrical problem and therefore declared emergency. The crew continued the descent until the aircraft impacted with a tree of about 6011(sic) and several other trees.”
The final impact of the aircraft with another tree was at 20m further down the flight path, while the fuselage was compacted from nose cone to the tail cone. Such a high speed impact scenario is only comparable with a military high-speed supersonic crash.
Sky Executive Aviation Services got an approval to import and operate three (3) LET-410 UVP aircraft in Nigeria. But the airline, for economic reason or other reasons best known to itself, negotiated for the aircraft's acquisition in the Republic of Congo and then cleverly and sneakily avoided the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) from carrying out the pre-importation inspection.
The Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), on the other hand, could not claim ignorance of the operation of, nor the existence of the aircraft in the country and yet nothing was done to arrest the situation or stop the illegal operation of the company.
It looks as if, co-ordination within the authority is incoherent, because as one department was having nothing to do with the operator, another was granting the same operator with clearances and waivers so that the company's operations could continue.
neither the CVR nor the FDR was fitted in disagreement with the Civil Aviation Regulations. The engines were not maintained in accordance with the standard procedure required for air safety. Both engines had exceeded the overhaul time by 242hrs as at the time of the accident.
N0. 2 Propeller had also exceeded the overhaul time by 62hrs at crash time.
Findings show that there were conversational problem between the controller and the pilots who could not speak much English language.
The quality and capability of the two pilots left many doubts about their performance as able pilots, who were worthy the salt of the professional accolade accorded them. Maybe, this could be a cogent reason why the managing director was over protecting and shielding the pilots from being examined by the NCAA's Licensing Department. The accident, therefore, may be categorised as poor handling by the operating
crew. “