Originally Posted by
OK 465
So when the FD's returned, there was no visual indication of VSW, i.e. no real good visual indication of stall proximity or the inadvisability of pulling up again at this point.
Originally Posted by Clandestino
For the time being, this seems to be the correct assessment. However, altitude display was available so why would anyone consider a good idea to pull, especially as MAX REC was discussed just a couple of minutes before and the aeroplane was very near it, or to pull while something is shouting "STALL STALL STALL" in the cockpit is something I find inexplicable in rational terms.
If you will notice, no where during the pull up was there ever a mention of actual altitude by the crew, only that weird "go down" recommendation from PM.
It would seem that this crew was already so stressed, that neither of them actually read the altitude numbers, and they only noted the scrolling of the altitude tic marks on the PFD.
What could cause this level of stress? Other than it was a black and turbulent night, and neither of the pilots had experience with UAS or Alt2 at altitude (which is enough to make most pilots edgy), it would appear that the initial overcontrol of roll caused an adrenaline flood when the aircraft refused to calmly follow PF's piloting efforts.
Something really got to these guys. What else is unusual about the first 30 seconds after the AP dropped that would set them on edge? How many of the 30+ flights that didn't lose control experienced roll oscillation?
Response was completely according to the tired old cliche: To go up, pull back on the stick, to go down, pull back further.
Yep!