Originally Posted by jcjeant
this show how much earlier (far before the AF447 event) was the preoccupation about the Pitot tube problem and it's possible consequences ....
(...)
Yes .. indeed .. despite all the earlier preoccupations .. it was unluckely no rush ....
It was basically the same procedure for both Rosemount and Thales replacement: no emergency AD, no immediate grounding until the mater is resolved, just the timeframe in which all probes are to be replaced while aeroplanes could keep on flying. What is the point you are trying to argue?
Originally Posted by jcjeant
Gagarin was not really an experienced pilot ..
Are you trying to make a principle out of illustration? Namely: inexperienced=unsafe? So, what do you think was the experience in manual flight, at cruise altitude, in ALTN law of thirtysomething 330/340 crews that all of a sudden had to perform the feat? How come they survived?
Originally Posted by jcjeant
His aswer was .... do nothing !
Doing nothing would have saved them. So would executing the memory items. There are many combinations of power and attitude that will keep you flying. 17.9° pitch above MAX REC alt will not, even with TOGA.
How can one conclude that the exasperated (and a bit cut-off in post-production ) answer of mr Rosay to mediapersons working on dramatization of AF447 represents the one and only right thing to do, rendering all the prescribed procedures wrong, escapes me.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Easy stuff in turbulence
Note on page 43 and graph on the page 42 of interim 3 clearly show that turbulence was of short duration, light to moderate intensity and has completely stopped by the time the second, fatal, pull was initiated. Notwithstanding whether "Easy stuff in turbulence" argument is true or not, it is utterly inapplicable in AF447 case.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
I like that ''If''
Your like or dislike does not alter the fact a bit. Page 20 of interim 3 refers.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
It does not matter, both should trigger the very same procedure (the new one) NOSE PITCH DOWN + THRUST REDUCE
It's attempt at dumbing down the procedure to unachieavable level, no matter if it proposed by Airbus or some PPRuNer. Applying such a procedure for low level approach to stall can easily result in unnecessary deaths and damage to property.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
but it is absolutely non sense you pretend to be comfortable to apply it vitam eternam.
Straw man argument. It is supposed to be applied until QRH is brought out and correct values for weight found and set. If it takes five minutes of fumbling, it won't kill you in this five minutes. Or until the fuel runs out but that doesn't mean it should be applied indefinitely.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
When BEA and others like Clandestino state,
It's not me and BEA, it's just BEA. I only repeated its findings for the benefit of those too lazy to look it up themselves or are too preoccupied with their pet theories/agendas to notice them.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
that other UAS events had a positive outcome, can the difference to AF447 partially be found in this list?
Maybe. What is the difference if low speed stability is available or not? It can be overridden by a pull on the stick and that certainly wasn't lacking.
Anyway, here's the important difference
Originally Posted by BEA, interim 2
Nine cases of triggering of the stall warning were observed.
(...)
The variations in altitude stayed within a range of more or less one thousand
feet. Five cases of a voluntary descent were observed, of which one was of
3,500 feet. These descents followed a stall warning;
(...)
The stall warning triggers when the angle of attack passes a variable threshold
value. All of these warnings are explicable by the fact that the airplane is in
alternate law at cruise mach and in turbulent zones. Only one case of triggering
was caused by clear inputs on the controls.
Originally Posted by OK465
I guess I'd like to know how do I then get into each of these conditions and then how do I recognize which one I have, which ones 'latch', which can be recovered to a different level of reconfig, or do I even need to know any of this?
Good question. Most important is to recognize that all the technical jargon about laws signifies that the safety nets are no longer there. Pilot able to understand the state of the aeroplane and to control it will perform well no matter the law. Pilot that gets disoriented and/or confused will not be saved by the computers in degraded FC laws.