Lyman;
PJ2... "Neutral". Someone needs to at least offer a possibility why PF chose to climb, and appeared not once to be satisfied.....With ADI, and a nosy PNF?
I am counting on the BEA Human Factors Group for this. Many here have posited serious and plausible theories to account for the sustained NU input. Early on, the Airborne Express DC8 accident was introduced as a possible explanation - the natural tendency to pull back if going down; - the DC8's control column was held in the full-NU position all the way to impact, as was the case with the Northwest Airlines B727 accident. The memorized UAS drill has been discussed, with sub-theories attending to a general inexperience in high-altitude manual handling of transport aircraft throughout the industry possibly pointing to a correct but over-controlled input by the PF and tolerance by the PNF while the PF settled the response down. Inadvertent, unintended NU input while responding to the right roll has been discussed.
The laziness with which the chain of incompetence and criminality was covered up was breathtaking.
In aviation, the burden is borne by the common man, through taxes, and the product is consistent with most ventures assigned to the public 'servant'.
In examining the U.S. political economy and events which led to October 2008 and the numerous boom-bust cycles from the Nineteenth Century on, yes, I agree with all your views. Dekker and others have written about "what's common" between aviation, medical and economic "accidents" and I think there is fertile ground for decades of research from which ad-hoc societal change will emerge. The masses will eat cake for only so long, so to speak, but, except for very specific areas of concurrence when it comes to why organizational accidents occur, we are way off topic. I re-emphasize that I think Vaughn's book is the reference work for highlighting the shift from assessements of amoral calculation to the normalization of deviance, which, I believe, is far more prevalent as an operative factor in organizational behaviours, at least in high-risk enterprises, than the former.