Machinbird;
Re, "Hi PJ2. I am assuming this statement was not directed at my previous posting but as a general caution to those who would analyze accidents."
You assume correctly, and my apologies!...not directed your way at all, (as I know you know your stuff), but placed as part of the discussion I wished to have on the topic so that others might take up the conversation as well. I think it is a very timely discussion, given that the report is on its way. The quote I used is exactly as it appears in Dekker's book, including the "(you think)" phrase, (Ch 5/pg39) and it was my unfortunate oversight that did not clarify the quote.
My conclusions with regard to AF447's crew's performance resulted from an analysis about what must happen for success, and then examining the record for evidence of these critical performance activities (and not finding them).
Precisely.
There is no hindsight in examining the record of what is. Hindsight bias is an interpretive gesture, not an investigative act.
Your comments on the SS were taken as intended - as entries into the dialogue and not as recommendations or even suggestions.
A stressed pilot is very likely to miss that type of cue.
Yes, we already know that it is possible for whatever reasons, to miss serious, emergency warnings designed to grab and focus attention. In my view I think this in itself is worth a full examination - why did this occur?
We know already that, first, comprehension through thorough training, and trust, which follows belief in the airplane and its systems and instrumentation, is paramount to safe flight. As many have said, we have here an accident like no other.
The record shows a lack of crew coordination and understanding of the airplane and of high altitude flight. Considering why, is an investigative act. I think the best example on record for highlighting this shift in thinking from thinking about how crews should behave to why they behaved the way they did, is still Diane Vaughn's book because she talks about her hindsight bias first and then shows how her persistent investigative work and open mind made such biases visible and provided the foundations for the shift in perception.
ALF, It is a pleasure to have your input again on this thread
Indeed it is...also, great cartoon.
Quote:
Originally Posted by mm43
though one has to ask, "What part did the Regulator have in this lackadaisical environment ?"
That I think we already know. They were a part of the "Drift into Failure".
The following statement is a
general observation and is NOT to be understood as referring specifically to any regulator or airline here. The statement carries no meaning other than what it says. That clear, I want to observe that we already know that too comfortable or cozy a relationship between regulator and private corporation is unhealthy for both, and also for the end-users of and in both organizations. It has occurred in the past and has resulted in incidents and accidents. The regulator must be free to enforce or support as necessary but to retain authority of standards. That was my initial reaction to SMS and as far as I'm concerned the jury is still out on the self-regulation of airline safety...another thread entirely.