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Old 4th Jun 2012, 04:30
  #1081 (permalink)  
Machinbird
 
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Originally Posted by PJ2
Dekker also contributes a succinct understanding and measure, by which the phenomenon of hindsight bias is made visible in our thinking and discussions: He writes in " The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error
", (2006, Ashgate), "What (you think) should have happened cannot explain people's behaviour."
Hi PJ2. I am assuming this statement was not directed at my previous posting but as a general caution to those who would analyze accidents. I have a copy of Mr. Dekker's field guide in my library. I have seen two accidents long ago that caused me to examine my thinking and I understand well how the cockpit view differs from the external view.

My conclusions with regard to AF447's crew's performance resulted from an analysis about what must happen for success, and then examining the record for evidence of these critical performance activities (and not finding them).

Dekker's new book "
Drift into Failure Drift into Failure
" is more likely to be highly relevant to the underlying causes of the AF447 accident. What has me highly concerned is that the same causes are very likely to be found active in other airlines to varying degrees due to the similar operating environment. Guess I know where I should use that Amazon gift certificate I received awhile ago .

My statement with regard to backdriving the sidestick should be interpreted as meaning that I believe it is technologically practical to do so based on my slightly outdated understanding of automation devices. It should not be interpreted as a recommendation. I would only suggest it if it was practical to lay a hand on the second stick and perceive the other side's inputs effectively by tactile means. That may require some research.

The PFD is highly cluttered already, and I too question the effectiveness of changing the color of portions of the display to signify important changes in operating mode. A stressed pilot is very likely to miss that type of cue.

ALF, It is a pleasure to have your input again on this thread.

Originally Posted by mm43
though one has to ask, "What part did the Regulator have in this lackadaisical environment ?"
That I think we already know. They were a part of the "Drift into Failure". Where the blame lands is for the courts to decide. However, blame is not relevant to accident investigations in most cases.

Last edited by Machinbird; 4th Jun 2012 at 06:04. Reason: remove excess 'of' word
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