alf5071h;
Old Carthusian, et al, “How is this relevant to AF447?” All that has been said or might be said about AF 447 or Fukushima, is in hindsight.
A very interesting critique, alf5071h, thank you for this. Having read and enjoyed your many observations here and elsewhere I know that there is a depth of knowledge and experience behind these comments.
I believe there is something more subtle than is being expressed in terms of categorizing "
all that is said"
only as hindsight. My question is, how do we proceed if all is merely hindsight and if not, what determines the difference? The paper you cite helps answer this question - so does Starbuck and Farjoun's later book, (2005),
Organization Beyond the Limit.
However, I do argue that in the case challenged, (Fukushima), foresight was indeed in place but was set aside.
It is well understood, as demonstrated in the public record, that the risks of tsunami to the Fukushima Daichi installation were clearly stated long before the tsunami, (
NYT, 2012). Further, it is clear that statements of clear risk and potential outcomes, (meltdown) were completely ignored by Tepco and others including the Japanese government. The risks were clearly delineated beforehand and the ensuing disaster as a result of a separate catastrophic natural event was entirely predictable and preventable. Hindsight bias is different than a recounting of the available record.
Are we really able to understand the situation as these people did at the time of their assessment and decisions?
Well, in one sense no, never. We are not them, we were not there. Also, risky conclusions about how people behave can and do occur. As the paper you link to observes, even the CAIB attempted to avoid hindsight bias.
If we are, then we must carry equal responsibility for not acting to prevent such disasters. No, at best we might say that our judgement was flawed, or more accurately that we lacked foresight.
Foresight can arrive in a number of ways. The notions of possibilism are broached in Lee Clarke's two works, "Worst Cases" and "Mission Improbable". Possibilisitic thinking provides a context in which what is possible and not merely probable, may be discussed. In Fukushima, "what is possible" was dismissed as "improbable" and further consideration of "what is possible, (after a 9.0 earthquake and a tsunami had flooded the diesel generators)?" was deferred in favour of a probabalistic argument. Answering the question, "Why?" relies heavily on hindsight work and can be valid so long is not "after-casting" and that change based upon new knowledge results.
In this case foresight was not lacking, so was judgement flawed or was there "organizational structurally-induced inaction"; - were the actions of TEPCO closer to making management decisions rather than engineering safety decisions?Regardless, your observation is interesting and I think really worth discussing in depth as we near the next phase of the AF447 threads.