O.C.;
Just as likely was that the PF went into a state of shock and couldn't process any of the information directed at him by the PNF.
I think so. First, these days it is highly unusual to experience a serious abnormal and even more rare to experience a full-blown emergency.
With 2900+ hrs TT and 807hrs in the A340/A330, (216hr on type), the PF almost certainly will not have experienced a significant failure with full application of adrenaline. Many will go an entire career without it, so highly-successful are the historical and present technological solutions to the safety of flight.
So while the sim recurrent work will have covered the abnormals and emergency procedures for these aircraft, most transport pilots here likely including yourself
OC, can tell us that when they do occur, an inflight abnormality or emergency places psychological demands on one that cannot be experienced or taught in training. An abnormality requires significant self-discipline to collect and order one's thoughts and actions. And each person has slightly different responses in such circumstances which is up to CRM to sort out and quickly make a "fighting team", as it were, out of two cockpit crew on a routine mission.
We cannot look to individuals for what we may now consider as "their lack of experience", as every one of us who fly or used to have been there too. We cannot give a course in "More Experience". I think you have expressed it well. We have to look more broadly, which is one reason I considered broaching the sleep inertia matter. We can examine SS vs CC, last-remembered actions for an after-takeoff UAS drill, training, training records, script priorities, airline culture and so on. There are other matters that we could name. The fact is, the accident
did occur when in 30+ UAS events it did not; Why here? If factors which are identified as primary and those that are categorized as contributing are fixed, where, in human factors especially, must we look towards next?