Interesting configuration madzadriver, only issue with an offshore access system (OAS) such as deployed on the Smit Kamara is that it is unsuitable for our installations over here i.e. Hibernia is a concrete GBS with no spider deck to cellar deck access, and the other two installations are FPSOs. Drilling platforms such as the semi-submersibles we use over here would also have limited options.
Brings back memories of the "flotels" that we used back in the offshore hook-up days and the bridges that sometimes didn't lift or fell over the side.
I can see this system being of benefit in older jacket design areas, especially in the Gulf of Guinea and offshore Malaysia, where they currently use Billy Pugh and rope swings (seriously, we swing on a rope over to the platform!).
Helo transfer for many reasons is still the preferred option, but recently it seems that there is more emphasis in skewing the stats to justify the decision to keep flying a/c with IMHO base design errors and/or manufacturing defects. It was mis-interpretation of the Waldron report that was the root cause failure mode of Cougar 491 i.e. galled titanium studs, but other factors such as increased filter changeouts due to filter bypass pop-up activation were also factors.
Are we too reliant on HUMS and its interpretation these days, G-REDL is an example of where IMO we were partly let down by reliance on this monitoring technique i.e. redeployment of the accelerometers and subsequent invalidity of 1st stage epicyclic bearing monitoring until the software was updated.
I'm a layman, so for me if you find a defective component and trace its failure mode to a mechanical defect then you replace those suspect parts, not rely on data that may or may not be 100% accurate. If that part just happens to not be readily available and will have a detrimental impact on a/c availability to the operators, then so be it.
Safe flying
Max