HazelNuts39, your question I don't have a simple answer to.
Caveat: the following is an attempt at analysis, not any sort of "truth" about what happened.
Let's suppose that the stall warning (created by the sustained "zoom climb," which is a matter of either scan breakdown or perhaps an internal decision to use nose to control speed to avoid overspeed ... ) triggered the "low altitude stall warning" response, which might be described and depicted in your graph, albeit with a nose attitude not set and held very well.
1. What stall warning ought to trigger is a decision to reduce angle of attack, particularly when stall warning happens at cruise altitude. It didn't. Why is that? Unknown. (Estimate: In part, I don't think either pilot had a sense of the AoA of the wing. I also wonder at their training regarding "high altitude stall, high altitude approach to stall.")
2. As the warning sustains over time (50-60 seconds) the control inputs do not show a trend of AoA reduction based upon your graph. The overall trend is to climb toward limits of performance envelope (if not into it). What seems to be going on in the cockpit is that the pilot who took the actions you describe is not getting the result he expects.
(Expectation: "If I go to CLB and TOGA, I should fly out of this stall warning.")
Note: his / their response
at cruise altitude (with a lower altitude set of procedures) isn't the response one would expect. (Do I hear the
Pitch and Power Chorus warming up in the background?)
At some point in that 50 - 60 seconds of response, I conclude a cognitive mismatch:
"What I am doing to treat stall warning is not curing my stall warning sympton."
This could lead to internal conclusion that "A/S is unreliable, this stall warning is unreliable or spurious
since what is supposed to fix it didn't."
Further stall warnings, when they come back on well into the stall, are ignored during the period when a potential remedy (nose down, fly out of the stall, begun somewhere above ~ 12-15000 feet?) to stall could be attempted.
The signal "stall warning" is never converted into either pilot's awareness "you are stalled" realization. I believe that if PNF had diagnosed "we are stalled" he would have said so to the PF.
(From my example, my flight student never converted "lights and warning noise" to "your gear are still up" realization.)
Back to AoA, which is measured but not displayed. There is no AoA gage to consult as a cross check. Neither pilot seems to have considered digging down through the pages to get a look at AoA. (Memory hazy: is it seven button / page actions to get there? PNF would need to do this, PF was behind the aircraft and trying to fly it). Given their task loading gradient and apparent misunderstanding of what is going on, I am not surprised that PNF didn't go head down in search of AoA on the pages. Were AoA a primary concern, the actions we see evidence of on the traces would probably have been different. Also, when captain at last arrives, would his glance at an AoA gage help him say "{Merde!} You are stalled, do x, y, z, etc." Don't know, maybe yes.
So there you go: if not initially (your point is taken on that score), then at some point subsequent, the stall warning was either
dismissed as suprious
or
ignored due to "what is it doing now?" problem solving/confusion overriding aural cues.
@ 0210, 47 sec.
Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
The thrust levers are moved back to 33° (2/3 of the IDLE / CLB range). The N1 decrease to 85% in 4 seconds.
That appears, from your graph, to be about six seconds before CLB TOGA are chosen. Did I read your graph correctly?