Mac, side-sticks; consider a ‘design’ view.
FBW – it’s state of the art; many technical, weight and cost reasons for using it; this has nothing (directly) to do with the choice of SS.
Certification regulations have evolved to require dual independent (separable) control systems. Mechanically these are relatively heavy, complex (mechanical components, reliability, and servicing), and space demanding = higher cost.
With conventional columns in normal operation, only one is used at a time.
In failure conditions – split systems, again only one column should be used at a time. This assumes that one system has jammed; but if not, then dual (opposing) inputs could be hazardous, and such situations requires crew knowledge and procedure to avoid a hazardous condition.
If dual inputs are made with conventional columns in normal operation, then the larger force might dominate (CRM arguments); some (the majority?) of control systems will auto-split, the force disparity being interpreted as a jammed system.
The choice of SS provides a simpler and lighter installation, which should reduce cost and increase reliability - not necessarily safer as this is a different argument. It also avoids the need for co-ordination during failure as an electronic voting and/or override facility can be provided. This should not be seen as something which is unique or of poor design, but an aspect which is a different implementation of existing requirements, and thus requires different understanding and training in aircraft operations – again some CRM views may have misunderstood this.
SS enables space for a ‘management’ table – modern aircraft operating concept.
Either SS or centre sticks (FBW) enable HOTAS, but note the modern industry’s reliance on autothrust systems.
A SS does not enable changing hands during manual flight; but note the recent dominance of autopilot operations - and why should you write and hand-fly at the same time.
Re control position/feedback. For column designs in normal operation, physical feedback is not required (advantages for hands-on during training, but note the increased use of simulators).
Columns enable some visual feedback of hand-wheel position (roll), less so for pitch, but this may be judged as a minor contribution to awareness which should focus on the outcome – what is the aircraft doing.
In abnormal situations, controls split or not, perhaps the rarity of events and inability to define the human contribution in such operations results in a design biased towards the older regulations.
Again, irrespective of the control input, it’s the output which is important: – consider a situation with a jammed feedback-enabled SS, its essentially the same as a non-feedback SS as there is no meaningful information. This point may be arguable w.r.t. recent (post Airbus SS) requirements for the avoidance of error (CS 25.1302), but in the absence of guidance as to what errors will be encountered (foresight), the non-feedback design appears satisfactory from a design view (which would include pilots’ views).
Thus a designer might well choose SS; the advantages outweighing the disadvantages. The initial certification costs might be high – proof of concept, but thereafter identical systems can be used in all future types. SS flight operations require changes in training, but these would consistent with a new type, and marketing will have a new ‘unique’ feature for all future types.
Like most aspects of aviation these choices involve human judgement, which is often subject to bias (including culture), and even where an apparent irrational choice has been taken, it was taken because it was right ‘at that time’.
Something vaguely associated with this – between theory W and theory Z
‘Fostering successes rather than reducing failures.