I think you'll find everything I said backed up by the investigators, the courts and and every aviation agency in the world.
I think you are intertwining factual information with personal opinions. Here is why:
Quote:
Originally Posted by CONF iture
To note that Mr R.A. Davis has been at the head of the prestigious AAIB during 15 years, and not only "an aircraft accident consultant" as the Airbus Response likes to describe him.
Your quote
Airbus wasn't knocking him, despite how you're trying to frame that statement. They were pointing out that he had been retired for several years before he took the case on. You can't bring a doctor back after an extended period of retirement without first familiarising them with the advances that have happened in their absence - so it goes with accident investigators.
Nowhere does Airbus point out what is in bold in your statement, that is your interpretation/personal opinion. Mr. Davis challenged the BEA report, particularly that of the recorded data.
IMO, that left both the BEA and Airbus no choice but to discredit Mr. Davis and his technical challenges, and they did. Much was at stake for Airbus, a new airplane, new concept for flight controls, first airplane delivered, a public demonstration and public conjecture that the airplane was at fault. It was important for Airbus to rebut, emphasizing the aircraft performed as designed. In the same way it was important for the BEA to rebut as they were under much heat for a perceived "botched & biased" investigation by the media and others, erroneous or not. This happens all the time in the courts with either the prosecution or the defense attempting to discredit a knowledgable expert witness and it happened in this instance.
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None of the crew believed they had gone that low - all evidence indicates that they didn't realise they were in any danger until they realised they were level with the trees - as such the CVR was routine up until that point, and quickly became a shouting match as they tried to get out of the corner they'd painted themselves into.
IMO, I don't see a shouting match at all, there were only six short vocal exchanges three by the F/O, three by the Captain once they reached 100 ft., the last comment by the Captain coming while descending into the trees.
Originally posted by RR_NDB
Would not be safer to allow a pilot to just exit the corner when absolutely necessary?
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In this case, no. I've already said that if Alpha protection had not checked Asseline's attempts to pitch up that the aircraft would have stalled and more would have died.
IMO, the bold in your statement is supposition for something that didn't take place and therefore can't be confirmed one way or another.
Originally posted by RR_NDB:
Rigid programming (hard limits) is really necessary? The pilots really need this kind of "protection"?
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[Clearly - sometimes - yes.
IMO, this gets back to the philosophical FBW debate, your opinion, not a fact.
Your quote
Funny that an allegedly "conveniently buried" issue has already been brought up at least three times in the course of discussing AF447, an incident which bears no relation to AF296 in any way, shape or form on a technical or procedural level.
IMO, there are always overarching fundamentals, whether they be familiarity with and understanding of the aircraft operating systems, training, improvements and or changes in basic written operational instructions that may differ from one incident to another. Nevertheless, there are relations from this aspect or point of view.