ICBM,
I do have to come in here, as once again we are getting partial views of historical fact.
JFH was, in the end, a failure. I say that with some real regret, having been part of setting it up. It failed because, in the end, the people who owned it (the RAF, who had been given the assets and people) did not do what they had been tasked to do, which was to maintain a force capable of both land based and maritime operations.
They got to failure by a combination of active decision (delete SHAR) obfuscation (assuring Fleet that 4 GR7/9 squadrons could maintain a dual land/sea capability) and then neglect (failed to maintain seagoing currency). The failure was confirmed by the 'Fail' assessment awarded to the last JFH embarkation on Ark Royal. The fact that it was an RN led unit just showed how far Strike Command had let the capability decline.
It was a mess, and no, it's not at all 'rich' to but the blame on the 'light blue'. JFH was under the command of the RAF, its assets and personnel owned by the RAF. All fact. Some like those facts, some don't.
Going forward, which is what this thread is about, there needs to be careful thought now over ownership (by which one could consider SDH/DDH/ODH) of the maritime strike capability. My own view is that it has to be owned by an organisation that is committed to maintaining it.
Best Regards as ever
Engines