@RF4/franzl :
There's a missing piece of info that renders this statement interesting (my bold)
2 h 11 min 38 Controls to the left (Selects LHS sidestick priority and puts the [LHS] SS to the full left stop)
What this means is that his words could be referring to either of his actions, or indeed both. I've not had any definite confirrmation as to what he was likely to be implying here.
In any case, this doesn't seem to be perceived by the PF as a definite assertion of control, as 2 seconds later he's back on his own sidestick.
We're losing a lot of context in transcript and translation, so it's difficult to read too much certainty into what he was saying. Your point of view is that he was almost as at sea as the PF, which may be valid. But I see another way of reading it - which is that he was aware he might have had a better handle on things but wasn't sure, hence the nervousness about the arrival of the Captain, and his automatic delegation and deference to the same as soon as he arrived.
Was it a "pilot monitoring, [fully] in the loop"? Probably not.
But - prior to the Captain's arrival - he definitely seems to be more savvy than his colleague when he does open his mouth. His calls are correct (if non-standard) and his inputs more measured (although the latter takes some extrapolation). He puts all his faith in the Captain, even when the captain is not on the flight deck, and his confidence seems to wane when it seems that the captain (who has been called back from rest) seems none the wiser.
Either of us could be right or both of us could be completely wrong. I doubt we'll ever know for sure because the guys we're talking about are all dead. What we have to contemplate is the possibility that the Captain's decision to delegate the relief role to the junior F/O might have made the PNF reticent to act decisively.
We know that a steep command gradient can cause a PNF to not correct a senior PF (e.g. Birgenair, KLM4805) and we know that a more competent PNF will defer to his commander if they have been conditioned to defer to authority (e.g. Palm 90). What we have here is a scenario where a commander has made a decision on command gradient which runs contrary to that which might be expected, which is new to the study of HF.
Originally Posted by
CONF iture
The fact itself that such exchange becomes necessary highlights how information is suppressed by the Airbus sidestick concept.
I've said before that it's a drawback to the sidestick concept, but there are benefits in some scenarios which outweigh it.
I find amusing how DW ... is teaching you what flying is and more specifically instruments flying :
Not in the least. I'll happily defer to Franzl on flight and aerodynamics factors, but HF is an area in which we're both on fairly similar ground. Given that you (CONF) have repeatedly misrepresented the importance of airspeed to the alpha (AoA) max calculation, I guess we're even.
BTW Dozy, it is taking place everyday in the world, and not only in flying school. You don’t hear about it everytime it is successful.
Nor do you hear about successful sidestick handovers. Let me get this straight - are you saying that it *is* the norm on a scheduled flight for one pilot to take control from another without saying a word?
OK - so the grounding date may be set in the future, but it doesn't change the fact that an AD would have been overkill in this case.