Hi DozyWannabe,
or (as in the case of the LH A320) they take the assumption that in a pressure situation a PF will automatically relinquish the controls as soon as a superior PNF touches them as hard fact
I'm glad you raised this one because it perfectly shows what happens when the crew don't realise how much aileron is being applied to satisfy their roll request. They both applied full roll side stick, but because it was in ground Law - they only got half aileron (above 70 kts)!!! ???
From page 46 of
http://www.bfu-web.de/cln_030/nn_226...indlanding.pdf
"The aircraft touched down shortly after the 1,000 ft marker in the touchdown zone, about 2 m left of the runway centreline lights with the left wing 4° down and the fuselage pointed 2° to the right of runwayallignment, whereupon the rudder pedals were returned to the neutral position.
The aircraft yawed towards the left, thereby increasing the lift from the right wing and decreasing that from the left wing. In spite of the co-pilot's right sidestick correction, this resulted in unintended contact between the downwind main landing gear and the runway. The objective had been to land with wings level. This was confirmed by the correct application of right sidestick prior to touchdown, which was intuitively supported by the Captain's sidestick (dual input).
After touchdown the aircraft yawed a further 5° to the left. The left main landing gear lost contact with the runway. At no time did the right main landing gear make contact with the runway. Lift dumpers (partial spoiler extension) remained inactive, because the necessary prerequisites were absent.
During the next few seconds the aircraft rolled to a 23° left wing down attitude in spite of the full right deflection of both sidesticks and application of right rudder. The
switch to Ground Law limited the effect of roll control corrections. The left main landing gear again made contact with the runway. At about the same instant, the left wingtip made contact with the runway."
Page 48 "The investigation showed that the
pilots could not have been aware of the crosswind flight control characteristics in close proximity to the ground and which were dependent upon the aircraft design. It is impossible to clarify whether the pilots would have taken a decision for a go-around procedure earlier had there been a risk evaluation that included
aircraft system behaviour, then unknown to the crew, in this wind situation with the possible effects of gusts. The BFU is of the opinion, that the respective knowledge would probably have influenced the decision."