Originally Posted by bubbers44
Am I missing something???
Both of you are missing the basic aerodynamic fact that either procedure will result in aeroplane that is flying, not stalling! Of course it's far better to maintain the known cruise pitch and power, caveat is "known". If it is not known, 5° ANU with climb power is safe attitude+power for almost any aeroplane (exception being high powered, low mach limited designs, not in production anymore). Collision risk does come into play with memory items, yet chances of having mid-air have to be weighted against chances of losing control. No extra points for guessing which is more likely to occur when ADCs go nutty.
some recent low-level training (UAS event right after takeoff) that triggered AF447's PF to increase the pitch attitude of the aircraft because it was the only thing he could recall in this confusing and poorly-designed memorized drill and checklist.
I don't think so. He reduced pitch when warned by CM1, then pulled hard when stall warning went off. Nothing suggests trying to achieve any target pitch or any rational procedure at all. IMHO, it was sheer panic that doomed the flight, like the one Richard Bach wrote about
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Originally Posted by Richard Bach: Loops, voices and the fear of death
Certainly there are hundreds of pilots who fly without fear through black nights and over miles of fog, but their peace comes not from knowing and control, it comes from the blind faith in the crate of metal parts that is an engine. Their fear is not overcome, it has simply been masked by the sound of that power plant. When that sound fails in flight, I give you fear, stronger than ever. it is not legality or guarantee that determines our safety, but how well we can fly.
Methinks FMS/autopilot/ADC failure can have the same effect on the airline pilot who doesn't know his aeroplane and doesn't feel confident he can control her when times get rough as the engine failure has on the pilot of piston single on night cross-country. However, as a lot of crews made it unscathed through similar ordeal to AF447's I am not so pessimistic to suspect the malaise is widespread. Also I still maintain that middle of the WoCL significantly affected the crew's performance for the worse. There's not enough data in preliminary reports to conclude whether the crewmembers were underperforming before the accident flight.
We don't have FCTMs (or A330s, for that matter) yet we recently had a hairy situation where relevant chapters of AFM and AOM differed. Our CAA's ruling was very quick: since AOM is recognized as OM-B, it should be followed when discrepancies with other manuals arise. Was AF FCTM part of OM-D?