Lyman;
Regarding the position of the sidestick, I will say this - when first checking out on the A320, (left seat, 1992), I was a bit taken aback and even mildly concerned that the "iron cross" symbol for the position of the opposite sidestick which was displayed on the PFD during takeoff, was removed at, (IIRC) 100ft RA. I thought it was a useful symbol so the other pilot would always know the position of the other sidestick. Over the years there were so few circumstances that made such knowledge necessary that I quickly got used to the symbol's absence. Also, sidestick movements are normally very small - 2, 3 degree-shifts when flying manually - the recent exhibition of sidestick-stirring in that video demonstrated precisely what NOT to do with the stick - the guy who posted it ought to be embarrassed - the airplane is subtle. The flight controls are already "busy" trying to maintain the last selected attitude - the airplane can be "flown" hands-off once the desired attitude is set...because FBW means, no input = no output and so no change in attitude, even in mild turbulence.
Here, I do not believe a yoke would have made a significant difference. The pitch attitudes displayed on the PM's PFD (and, we assume, the PF's PFD) would have/should have provided ample information regarding the attitude of the aircraft and what to do about it, (immediately!). The yoke may have made an initial difference given the visibility of its movement rearward, but almost within seconds, the results of the sidestick's half-way deflection were known to both pilots and I would have expected the PM to say "Stop! - I have control" or something to that effect. So there is possibly a cultural element at work here as well - in fact the third report comments on this but not wanting to take the airplane away even when things are coming badly off the rails is still a psychological "barrier" even though CRM has begun to tear it down.
This is about flying an airplane...C172, Viper, T38, DC8, A330, A380...here, no difference. After the stall had been deeply established, the potential for confusion increases exponentially and the possibility of recovery decreases by the same amount because there were in territory where no test pilot had ever been let alone any line pilots.
We may hope that one outcome may be increased awareness of and avoidance of stalling one's transport aircraft because those accidents on the increase over the past eight years or so.