Originally Posted by
Owain Glyndwr
If he was fighting an overspeed, why would he select TOGA?
The "crazy speed" comment comes well after selecting TOGA if I recall correctly. There seems to be a significant deterioration in joined-up thinking from the crew - and the PF in particular - after taking manual control.
This is why I am and always have been focused on where the training went wrong (and incidentally, why I get very antsy when others claim I'm arguing for a conclusion that begins and ends with pilot error). The consensus seems to be that the correct course of action would have been to cover the controls, but not actually do anything with them (or indeed leave them alone completely) until the aircraft's response to the conditions had been monitored for at least half a minute. It's all very well saying that from the comfort of our keyboards, but on a psychological level it's another thing entirely to have an aircraft suffer a failure in marginal conditions and retain the willpower to not intervene - especially for less-experienced flight crew.
Holding back and seeing how the aircraft copes is a universal thing, by which I mean it's true regardless of whether one is flying a FBW jet with bells and whistles, or something more traditional - because in both cases the aircraft has been trimmed to remain more-or-less stable. The exception to this rule is of course when a flight surface problem has occurred - but such events are rare enough to be a fair way down the mental list of potential failures.