Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
Clandestino,
For distribution of liquid water and ice particles in convective clouds, read IR#3 page 50.
Very good, and I am not saying it ironically, I really think it's good we are starting to discuss reports and not media hype.
So let's take this line of discussion a bit forward; page 50 of interim 3 deals with general distribution of water and ice particles in convective cloud, as introduction to principles of operation of Wx radar.
Interestingly, BEA findings on the conditions that were most likely encountered by AF447 crew is also on page 50 but of interim 2.
Originally Posted by BEA
The crews reported not observing any significant radar echoes on the
chosen flight path(8) but to have identified active zones nearby or lower,
which is also noted in a study by Météo France on these events undertaken
at the request of the BEA;
(8)Some crews had deviated from the planned flight path for meteorological reasons before the events occurred.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I don't doubt that the PF and the rest of the crew were doing everything they could think of to rescue the situation - the question is why did their training not encompass the *correct* things to do?
The crux of the matter is not "doing" but rather "recognizing" the correct thing to do. I have not an ounce of doubt that the crew believed they were doing their best to save themselves up to the very end. That their perception of the situation had 180° phase shift relative to reality is tragic and it must not be simply written off as "pilot error". To paraphrase sir Winston Churchill: "The cost of solving the AF447 mystery must be reckoned in neither money nor manpower."