Gentlemen,
It might be useful to remember the circumstances that led to FJCA, and the intentions for the UK F-35 fleet.
Cast your minds back to 2000 and the heady days of 'Joint Force Harrier' standing up. The RAF and RN had agreed that, in return for the RN relinquishing ownership of its fixed wing fleet, the RAF would command, operate and develop JFH as a two aircraft fleet, bringing AD and Strike assets together into a fleet of aircraft that would support both land and sea based ops, using STOVL aircraft.
We had also committed to the JSF programme via a special 'STOVL MoU' which recognised the UK/US long partnership (over 45 years) on STOVL, and in which the UK stated that it saw the STOVL JSF as a key element of future UK tactical aircraft force planning. JFH was to be the 'route through' to those sunny uplands, building a true joint ethos ready to receive an aircraft that could deliver both AD capability and strike power from land or sea.
And to complete the picture, CVF was moving towards contract, built around a requirement that specified two large STOVL carriers with the capability to accept cat and trap as a fallback.
It was against that picture that the original Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA) programme, Navy owned, turned into FJCA - Future Joint Combat Aircraft. No change to requirements, just a change of title. Still a joint STOVL future. Sounded great. Then the wheels began to fall off the wagon.
First wheel off - within weeks of formation of JFH, the RAF, who now owned the SHAR, decided to offer it up as a savings measure to pay for the huge cost overruns on the GR9 programme. Sadly, the RN went along with this, reassured that a 'Joint Air Wing' would form up to maintain two FAA front line GR9 units to maintain embarked currency. Incidentally, a plan that was not even discussed with the engineering Fleet Managers for the GR7/9 fleet before it was approved. (But hey, the pilots said it was possible, and who was going to argue with them?)
Second wheel off - The RAF decided to block formation of the second RN commanded front line unit. At about the same time, the RAF decided that the Harrier fleet FEAR should be reduced, and thus effectively withdraw their commitment to maintain embarked currency. Result - marked reduction in ability of JFH to effectively embark in CVS and fight. But not a problem for the RAF, who understandably gave priority to the Afghan ops.
Third wheel off - SDSR 2010, and the RAF (CAS, with CDS support) makes a decision to dispense with Harrier to preserve its entire Tornado fleet. This decision was not discussed with CNS before it was given to the PM.
Now add in the final element - the RAF's hidden problem that it had blown all its future tactical aircraft budget (and a few other budgets as well) on Typhoon, leaving the square root of s*d all for a Tornado replacement. The failure of a number of options and programmes (FOAS, etc.) followed.
The result of all these is that the decision to for cat and trap (and I am not saying it's the wrong one) was not accompanied by the important discussion on what the future F-35C force was now going to do. All the public discussions to date have revolved around the impact on the carriers, but the impact on land based strike has hardly been mentioned. And when it does, we get the sort of single service language ('fishy', 'crabs') that prevent any rational discussion.
So, just for stamps, here's my put. First, having decided to go for F-35C, the UK should now see it through. Another reversal of course would, I think, involve even more expense and we would end up with a less capable jet. Second, accept that cat and trap can't be handled like JFH tried (and utterly failed) to do naval aviation. The RAF just isn't interested, nor in my view should it be expected to be. Leave the F-35C force to the RN to own and command, with a secondary role to go land based if required (which all FAA units had in the past). Third, meet the RAF GR4 replacement requirement with F-35A. It's radius of action is only 10 miles less than the 35C, and it's cheaper. Reduced RAF requirement, as the RN F-35Cs could, in some cases, come in as backup. Finally, task DE&S set up a joint training, support and sustainment model for the two F-35 customers. Lots of reaL commonality to exploit there.
Result? a mixed F-35A/C buy. The country gets what it needs - effective strike capabilities based on land and at sea, and both owned by people who are competent and committed. Pipe dream? Probably. But better than the 'ferrets in a sack' spectacle the country is watching now.
Best Regards as ever to those who, while all this is being played out, are in harm's way...
Engines