On indications i would suggest: FLASHING (or warning by other suitable means) when TWO are different. If THREE are different better to not be presented to crew: Likely just GARBAGE with "MISLEADING CAPABILITIES" like occurred in the Thiells 727 ferry flight.
Will comment further your recent posts on this, IMHO
very important issue:
Preventing loss of CONFIDENCE, CONFUSION and (potential) MISLEADING.
ACARS (currently) can be programmed to report UAS not observed (or observable) by crews?
Beacause
AFAIK UAS is being kept by the System as an "INSIDER INFORMATION". A privilege of the System. (as per mentioned Airbus SAS paper crew must scan...)
This IMO could even be considered A Design Flaw*: Simply because at reduced cost (negligible cost) you can do better:
1) System PROACTIVELY helping crew (informing UAS onset) and
2) system CLEARING the issue (for a likely busy crew: scanning, trying to correlate, etc.)
Remark:
A DSP (Digital Signal Processing) on ANALOG (raw) air data (before ADM) can seems as miraculous (even for us, EE's)
*
Or lack of an important AID to help crews yet submitted to dozens of Air Speed anomalies closely related to the sensors being used.
In the Thales (now formally obsolete) equipped A/C an effort (Review or upgrade) would be essential.
The mere replacement to the US probes ("BF") IMHO is not enough. Wait to the final report (and it's consequences) shows how slow the bureaucracy is.
In the meantime pilots are at risk in not detecting timely a sensor limitation in a design with no redundancy.