Good luck Thomas taking on the EU:
Non-privileged’ applicants, who may include individual employees, employers and trade unions, can directly complain to the European Court of Justice about acts of the EU institutions, but only under certain conditions: ‘Any natural or legal person may directly complain against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former’ (Article 263 TFEU). Although seemingly very wide, the ECJ has interpreted this provision very strictly. In the leading case of
Plaumann & Co. v. Commission,
Case 25/62, [1963] ECR 95, the ECJ allowed for individuals to complain about EU decisions directly to the ECJ only ‘… if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed.’
Specifically, the ECJ has refused to accept that collective organisations representing their members qualify as individually and directly concerned. For example, the ECJ refused to hear two cases where French works councils complained against decisions of the Commission allowing mergers between French companies to proceed (
Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes Sources v. Commission,
Case T-96/92 [1995];
Vittel v. Commission,
Case T-12/93 [1995]), and again in a case where a works council complained about a Commission decision condemning state aid to an industry (
Comité d’entreprise de la Société Française de Production v. Commission,
Case T-189/97 [1998]).
The result is that it is very difficult for complaints to be made by individuals against actions of the EU institutions, even where these affect employment and industrial relations.
Plenty have tried, none have succeeded. The EU is as the UK, it is called "Parliamentary Supremacy":
At the heart of the meaning of ‘Parliamentary Supremacy’ is that Parliament has ultimate law making authority. There is no other body within the UK that can legislate contrary to or go against and challenge laws of the UK Parliament. There is no higher source of law than that which Westminster Parliament enacts.
Classic authority for this principle can be seen in cases such as Edinburgh & Dalkeith Railway v Wauchope (1842) 8 CL&F 710, Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC 765, R v Jordan [1967] Crim LR 483 and Jackson v AG [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262, where challenges to Acts of Parliament on both procedural and substantive grounds failed. The courts have not entertained any assertions that they have the power to decide not to apply an Act of Parliament for any reason. The courts have said they can do nothing other than apply an Act of Parliament, regardless of what it says or how it was enacted (as long as it is an Act of Parliament).
Two minutes on Google would have stopped you ranting and raving and instead focused on how to obtain a JAR/EASA license instead.