The lead-up to the Australian MRH90 decision
It has been suggested I rejoin the debate this thread.
Why did Australia acquire the MRH90? It was a 'going away' present by then PM John Howard as a virtual last act before Election 2007 - along with 2 x LPD aircraft carriers - for his former MinDef Peter Reith who was working for Tenix post-political life; that outfit later being absorbed by BAE Systems. Tenix of course were driving the prospective LPD and MRH90 acquisitions. But what had happened in the 30 or so years preceding that decision?
'At the end of the Vietnam War, the argument was made in the United States, as well as Australia, that it would be sheer folly to become involved in distant, extended, Asian counter-insurgency campaigns or to structure the armed forces for such contingencies.' - Professor Alan Dupont, The Lowy Institute.
Embarkation on the thinly-veiled unified ADF experiment (a la Canada) initiated in 1974 also saw loss of focus on maintaining the military capacities and operational expertise hard won during the Vietnam War where, contrary to folklore, the independent armed forces functioned well jointly, as in prior conflicts wherein Australian forces had mainly conformed with British Joint Planning doctrine.
Pre-ADF formation, political oversight of the military was appropriately exercised but that morphed into Public Service domination, subsequent dismantling of a system whereby the armed forces had pretty well managed their own hardware acquisitions and the growth of monstrous substitute bureaucracies under 3 separate ministries now dominating defence matters. For years now, the central plank of Australian defence policy has been support of defence industry (largely foreign-parented) at the expense of military preparedness.
Since 1974, little effort was made to progressively optimise military hardware in service in Australia; but, majority of the aircraft platforms employed by Australian forces during the Vietnam campaign and subsequently have since been continually employed operationally by other nations and are still being optimised via ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs. For example; enhanced Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk versions and turbo engined ex-RAAF Caribou are now operating in Afghanistan with more of that discarded herd being re-engined.
Alan Dupont again: 'While our defence strategy must incorporate plans for dealing with a major conventional military attack against sovereign Australian territory (deterrence Yes, defence No - BR71), this remains a low-probability scenario and the ADF should not be primarily structured for such a threat. It makes no strategic sense to allocate the lion’s share of the defence budget to capabilities that have little or no utility for the conflicts most likely to engage the ADF, or which cannot be used because they do not have the necessary protection to survive in a high-threat environment (a failing of many past acquisitions). We need to give much higher priority to maintaining and sustaining the equipment we have by elevating the importance of logistics and remediation.'(my emphasis – BR71).
Maybe some more soon re Post #214 and 'remediating' the ADF helo force.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 10th Apr 2012 at 20:49.