Hi,
Old Carthusian, If i may respectfully ask and comment on some points:
Everything keeps on coming back to training, SOPs and CRM.
Everything?
(and remember the only instrument that was not reliable was the Airspeed Indicator)
How you can stay so sure on that? RHS was not even recorded. This information may be lost forever. Like the not measured AS during "sensors outage".
It is not that I am against adding such a warning but that the warning would not necessarily have made a difference to their response.
Well, this crash is history. What about this kind of warning in other flights in similar situations?
training should enable you to deal with the unexpected.
If just training could be sufficient why they decided to create an HF study group? The crew was affected just by "lack or inadequate training"? Other crews (with training) would be immune to similar issues? And if "multiple faults" happens (or are showed) simultaneously? The big bird (388) climbing out of Changi had multiple " simultaneous faults" due electrical cabling (harness) damage ( as a result) of the uncontained engine failure of eng #2.
There was no attempt to use the SOPs or to diagnose the problem.
We actually don't know why (if ever will). We have all factual info?
This is more indicative of flight crew problems
What other reasons you can suggest? Or could mention, please.
training should enable you to deal with the unexpected.
As a designer i would like to benefit from: "training should enable with the
unexpected" We never know what to expect. This is virtually impossible. You may anticipate just a subset. Creativity in some cases "makes the difference". I am not against SOP, etc.
Even the stall was recoverable
With a crew that (seems) failed to identify a "simple" UAS and subsequently stalled the jet? The SIM made and summarized by TD shows how difficult would be the "task".
The warning didn't help.
HF study was motivated by this (and other facts)
Unfortunately this is a crew caused accident
Certainly.
with very little help from the machine
We are anxious to read the final report on this.
It touches on pilot training and airline culture and how these are carried out with automation.
Lack of (training) at cruise FL
