Diagnostic
Everything keeps on coming back to training, SOPs and CRM. Supposing the crew were surprised then training should kick in. A pause, a scan of the instrument panel (and remember the only instrument that was not reliable was the Airspeed Indicator). PJ2 also pointed this out - this was not a serious incident at first. However, the crew actions made it into a serious incident. It also seems that the PFs scan broke down almost immediately and that the PNF did not intervene sufficiently. So a UAS warning might not have made any difference. This is why I asked the question - what guarantee do you have that yhey would have paid any attention to a UAS warning? It is not that I am against adding such a warning but that the warning would not necessarily have made a difference to their response. The cockpit voice transcript indicates a very rapid 'over reaction' to the initial incident. Once again this is not indicative of an interface issue. There was no attempt to use the SOPs or to diagnose the problem. This is more indicative of flight crew problems - training should enable you to deal with the unexpected. It seems in this case it didn't. We know from the other UAS incidents that these are recoverable and here once again I stress - outcomes are important. Even the stall was recoverable but once again there was a deficiency in the approach and this time with a clearly audible warning. The warning didn't help. Unfortunately this is a crew caused accident with very little help from the machine. It touches on pilot training and airline culture and how these are carried out with automation.