Hello
Diagnostic;
Enjoying reading your contributions, thank you. If I may offer a thought and a comment on the points of discussion between you and
Old Carthusian...
On an increase in automated responses, I can understand the logic of such an argument (the BUSS relies upon this logic), but what concerns me from a pilot's p.o.v. is long-term reduced situational awareness and the need for in-depth understanding of high-altitude, high-Mach No. swept-wing flight, (old fashioned "airmanship", I guess) because it is still humans who are doing the piloting.
I offer this view out of a concern for what remains inexplicable, and that is the instant decision to pitch a transport aircraft up at such high pitch-rates (increasing 'g'-loading to 1.55g) to such high pitch attitudes
and keep the aircraft there.
I would be interested in either data or an argument that this indicates an interface problem, for, as you are, I am open to any information that shows that normal training and SOPs for this event are inadequate in some circumstances and because of obscurity are best left to automated responses.
As has been observed throughout the thread by those who fly these aircraft, such pitch attitudes at cruise altitudes are simply never intentionally achieved for the very reasons loss of control occurred.
In re your observation, "Several other crews did
not recognise & handle UAS
correctly.", I don't recall specifically where there were untoward outcomes due recognition and handling issues with other crews in other events but again am open to new information. There are no characterizations one way or the other in IR2 [Interim Report 2], Appendix 7 regarding crew responses one way or another and from what I've read I don't see any descriptions of difficulties experienced by other crews in the body of IR2. There were a few events such as the Air Caraibes, (report
here, in French), the Northwest and the TAM events but to my recollection, (and I have been wrong on more than a few things before!), the UAS events haven't been problematic as most crews "did nothing" and the airspeed returned within a minute or less.
The argument here isn't at the stage of deciding whether more automation, the same level of automation or reduced interventions are needed. This is very much a continuing dialogue between pilots and engineers! The ability to "look through" the automation and decide for oneself what the airplane is doing, what it needs and why, is being lost because it is being supplemented and when supplements occur, practice and therefore skill, then thinking and knowing atrophy
I have had kindly pointed out to me a recent conference at the Royal Aeronautical Society entitled, "
The Aircraft Commander in the 21rst Century". There is an excellent
videoed presentation from this conference by Captain Scott Martin, (Gulfstream Experimental Test Pilot) on the very topic at hand. From the site:
In this exclusive video from the conference, Captain Scott Martin, Experimental Test Pilot at
Gulfstream Aerospace talks us through the evolution of the flight deck and how Gulfstream manages to balance the role of automation with providing easily accessible information for the pilot.
He also discusses key issues for future flightdeck design in integrating information technology and computers into aircraft and how this ‘second revolution’ in human flight not only affects the military and airline pilot, but also the GA and private flyer.
Additionally he talks about the expectations of the next generation of pilots in dealing with these glass cockpits and recommendations in designing the human-machine interface.