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mm43,
Hi,
Originally Posted by mm43
@DiagnosticThanks for your well thought-out post.
And thanks for your continued comments
Originally Posted by mm43
That "step beyond" was an attempt to stop the initial "misunderstanding" and/or "startle factor" that has previously been discussed. It may be viewed as problematic to an outcome, but we are currently dealing with an outcome that became a "problem".
I can certainly see some merit to an automated "UAS handling", and I firmly believe that the "startle factor" is indeed an issue to some extent, in any man/machine monitoring interface (as described in Dr Bainbridge's paper).
My specific concern is that if such automated UAS handling is introduced, then the (a) recognition of UAS and (b) subsequent actions, have got to be
correct.
I just don't know whether the level of confidence in the automation is there yet (and the pilot/passenger confidence in the automation!), to make this option (i.e. an
automated UAS response) better than leaving the human in the loop (i.e. a
guided UAS response / warning). I'm very happy to read the views of the experts in this area.
The option I am
most concerned about, is leaving the situation as it is, due to the inadequate UAS recognition and handling by the other crews (in addition to AF447) as highlighted in the BEA Interim Report 2. While this was only one hole in the AF447 "swiss cheese", if that hole can be closed (or at least made smaller), in a (relatively) low cost / low risk way, then surely we reduce the risk of all the holes lining-up again.
@
Old Carthusian,
Hi,
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
I still remain to be convinced by the man/machine interface explanation. We are running the danger of over-generalising from one specific example.
My point is that there is not just one example. If that was the case, I wouldn't be spending any time commenting on this point.
The BEA Interim Report 2 makes it clear (at least to me) that there is a much larger problem with UAS recognition & handling, which was the start of the sequence of events leading to the crash.
To use your words:
I "remain to be convinced" that, had the AF447 crew
truly realised that the "lost speeds" (to quote the PNF) were actually expected due to a temporary UAS, would any of the subsequent events leading to the crash have happened? Reduce the "startle factor", reduce the crew's concern that this is an unusual problem, remind them to turn off the FD etc. - does the PF then follow whatever (unfortunately unknown) cues he did, which caused the "zoom climb"? Perhaps not.
I'm not trying to convince you that I'm "correct", but over some decades working with diagnosing complex systems, I have seen many many times, that having an incorrect mental model of what is happening at the
beginning of a problem
drastically reduces the liklihood of correct handling (especially quick & efficient handling), as that problem continues. It's from that experience, that I see similarities with the sequence of events on AF447.
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
Nothing points to a problem with the interface - rather it consistently points to a failure of crew performance.
I politely suggest that if several crew's behaviour was wrong (which is a documented fact), then by definition, the "interface" isn't well-designed. Or there are many crews who are sub-standard. Which one is easier to fix?
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
Other crews have successfully dealt with the issue so why didn't this one?
If by "successfully" you mean "without crashing", then yes.
But as I've said before, I do not accept that as a good standard of measurement. Several other crews did
not recognise & handle UAS
correctly. Are you really OK with that, as long as they don't crash on that specific time they mis-handle it? I'm not. I see this as a larger problem which needs to be understood & fixed, so that crews do not (for example) follow incorrect FD commands, during UAS events.
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
This is the issue which all attempts to blame the machine fail to address. Why this crew?
See above - it's not just this crew who failed to recognise & follow the UAS procedure. I'm not trying to "blame" the machine - this is undoubtedly a "swiss cheese" situation with many holes. This is just one of the holes, but it's one where improvements (e.g. a specific warning / message is given), seems achievable.
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
What was so different about them that they couldn't follow the SOPs, that CRM was non-existant and that there was no clear chain of command?
I certainly agree that there were other problems like CRM (more holes in the swiss cheese). I'm just saying that, from everything I've read, UAS recognition & handling is one hole in that cheese, and if
any of the holes had been closed, then the accident wouldn't have happened.
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
The interface is not the issue because other crews handled it successfully.
See above. I politely disagree that it's possible to be so definite.
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
Training and culture can also be added to the mix
Agreed, although these are difficult & long-term issues. That's
not to say that airlines shouldn't try to improve these, but being pragmatic, I would rather have a partitial improvement (e.g. better UAS warnings, and perhaps assisted UAS handling) in the shorter-term, while waiting for longer-term improvements in training & CRM etc., than not have
any improvement in the shorter-term, while waiting for longer-term improvements.
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
but it also and significantly comes down to the individual members of the crew and does not go beyond them.
On this point I politely disagree, as I explain above. I'm happy to see if future posts change my mind, but I don't know how it is possible to be so definite that this is a crew-only problem (by which I interpret you as saying an AF447 crew-only problem).