"In the B767/B757 one has to execute the selection while in the Airbus FMC once selected the airplane is going to go there."
Not always, though I'm sure statistically reliable. I have heard (anecdotally) of the bus abandoning the Flight Path in favor of a turn, caught by pilots who then fly manually to destination. Since I am unwilling to be more specific, note I use the word "anecdotally". These occurrences, upon follow up, were not satisfactorally explained.
Have you heard of this?
On pp9-10 of BEA #3, there is a flight path narrative. On pp29-30-31, graphs indexed to CVR. The latter is more explicit, and one assumes, more reliable.
On the last of these three pages, at the top "Thrust levers to TOGA" (DFDR), there is an interesting flow of data, conversation. With TOGA, the RHS inputs 3/4 stop NoseDown. Strange, eh? The LHS, just prior to RHS "I no longer have control of the a/c" states: "We have the engines....what's happening?" If he was concerned about AoA/STALL, why would he take note of the Thrust at FULL as somehow comforting, instead of a dire threat to LIFT?
So it is strange to entertain that the pilots (including Captain) would be concerned with STALL (high altitude), and be OK with the engines at 100%+ N1?
At the very least, why did BEA choose to truncate the CVR just as the controls went LEFT, the PF had lost control of the ship, and the Captain enters "What are you doing?"
Is it a tease? Obviously there is a reason. What is in there that cannot be seen by the public?