It is a really interesting debate, and the very fact that everyone has such different viewpoints only serves to emphasise the complexity of the final (if there even will be a final!) decision making process. To respond to a few points, the intention with the SigInt and ElInt capability of aircraft is not to supply real time intelligence and analysis but to let the aircraft hoover up electronic outputs in theatre and download them post-mission for analysis. I don't think the capabilities are oversold in terms of ISTAR since having an integrated spot SAR has very positive ramifications for work such as CAS with restrictive ROE. Consistently in history there are warnings about basing future military acquisition on "the last fight" and I think that if we do go down the F18 (etc) route there is a real danger of that here. The talk in this thread of Day 1 strike is indeed tricky, but the questions raised are certainly deeper than do we want to be part of the Day 1 game. For example, do we want to be able to operate a small amount of aircraft persistently in a high threat RF environment? I would hazard, based on the current threats to international security that we might well do. If we are to resign ourselves more completely than current capability to not being a player in the Day 1 game then that rather raises more issues with the design and make of NATO and EU forces. Taking the Americans out of the picture as they move towards the Pacific theatre, the EU does and will require an indigenous "Day 1 "capability.
A very tricky problem to which there is no solution that will satisfy all the players, civil and military.
Alex