TD
A friend drives FBW, not Bus. He was cruisin along, sippin coffee when the a/c started a sweet turn to the right. Both pilots noticed immediately, and switched off the data drive, and flew HDG to the destination. He bird dogged the event with others in company, and no one could explain what happened. He did run across others it had happened to.
So this a/c will climb "unexpectedly" and Uncommanded, (to QUOTE Airbus) when UAS happens. Instead of "Inferring" proper instrumentation for 447, and without any conclusive rejection of "AUTOZOOM", I'd like to keep an open mind. In the meanwhile, the HF, which I have been trying to discuss (from a defensive pov, I'll admit), wants a clear and microscopic overview.
So far we have a too quick PU from RHS, a consequent loss of orientation (both airframe and crew) and that's it. This wreck can be argued to have happened within several seconds of autoflight loss, since all sense of PITCH and AOA slithered away through the fingers of our impatient pilot. POSSIBLY. The entire public perspective misses that fact. For want of a breath, and a count to five, the flight was lost. Fully half of the culpability for the crash after this time frame belongs to AF training, AIRBUS complacency and overconfidence, plus an arguably criminal case against AF for deferring a non deferrable.
I haven't even cranked up the dark field, or the scanning EM. Not to mention the gas chromatography room. Sometimes it is simple. Did I just frame the dilemma, simple to impossibly obtuse?