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Old 29th Mar 2012, 01:03
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DozyWannabe
 
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Heavens to Betsy, is this still going on?

Originally Posted by Lyman
To characterize post apogee Pitch inputs as "mostly nose-Up" is not fair.
Yes it is. When talking about average positions over time the inputs were *overwhelmingly* NU.

The a/c wandered NU/ND between -3 and +17 several times.
Yes - in response to the stall. Speed decays, nose comes down, speed increases but the aircraft pitches up and stalls again due to elevator/THS position.

The co-pilot input ND several tmes.
Not enough, and for nowhere near long enough. When we ran the scenario in the sim, the SS needed to be emphatically forward and held there for at least 8-10 seconds to correct the THS position and control the aircraft. This is speculation on my part, but having seen the PFD myself I suspect the PF was "chasing" the ADI indication in the same way he'd follow the FD.

The key aspect is that in order to perform the correct recovery procedure, the pilot in control needs to first understand what the problem is, and then perform a recovery based on the information they receive. For whatever reason the flight crew of AF447 didn't even get to understanding the problem, and the PF's responses were instinctive and consistently reactive.

It was PNF (LHS) who was doing the flying when the Captain entered and said "Er, what are you doing" LHS continued to fly during the initial phase of three pilot command.
No, he was never in control for more than a few seconds at a time, because the traces show the PF taking back control almost immediately without announcing his intent to do so.

And remember, the STALLWARN is WARN, not STALLED, necessarily.
I'd say if it's been sounding for a minute, there's a good chance that you're in the stall regime. This is immaterial however, as there's no acknowledgement that they ever even heard it.

At one point, both sticks were to the stops, left, and the a/c was Rolled right 4 degrees, and when one stick relaxed, it immediately Rolled right to 7 degrees. I still think there was a problem with the airframe, Rudder/Lateral, that favored Right Roll, chronically.
I don't know how much more simply I can put this. Lateral control via the ailerons is not reliable when this or any other aircraft is in the stall regime. Basic aeronautics - ailerons work by directing the airflow over a section of the wing. If a wing is stalled, it cannot produce lift, ergo if an aileron encounters stalled air it will not respond as expected. This is why full stall training at PPL level has the pilot use the rudder to level the wings via the side-effect of roll if necessary.

I think it is reactionary to dismiss the possibilities of 'desperate' measures, taken by crew. Also to 'assume' 'most' displays were 'working'.
...
I would think that a fair position would be: "With so much confusion, how could the instruments possibly be working?
Simple - these were FOs trained in the glass cockpit era. Most of their airline hours have in fact been with autopilot engaged. On the occasions they've flown manually, it has been done with the FD engaged and with the speed tape on the left clearly marking the safe range. They've not done any manual handling on basic instruments in that type other than possibly in canned simulator scenarios. It's like riding a bike or playing an instrument - the knowledge will always be there, but unless it's practiced regularly you will not be able to perform at your best in a scenario where you're suddenly called upon to do so.

I believe that when he says "we don't have any displays", he is referring to the displays that he has come to rely on for the entirety of his time in manual control of that type, namely the FD and max/min speed tape. I believe that the basic instruments were still available, but that he had come to rely on the electronic guides to the point that he was afraid of having to go back to basic panel flying.

I believe that the initial NU demand was an overcorrection to the turbulence that left them a touch ND in pitch, which started a series of instinctive panic reactions, complete breakdown of instrument scan and failure to calmly assess the situation. I don't believe this was entirely his fault because he was not properly trained for the situation that confronted him.
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